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I. INTRODUCTION
The wisdom of limited shareholder liability for corporate torts has recently
been questioned. 1 Several authors have suggested that changes in tort law and,
more important, increases in the amount of damage that can be caused by
corporate torts, have made unlimited shareholder liability appropriate for
corporate tort judgments. 2 The specific proposal that has received the most
attention is that of Professors Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, 3 who
advocate a system of pro rata liability of shareholders for corporate torts.
* The Oluo State University, B.S.E.E., 1978, M.S., 1980; Stanford Law School, J.D.,
1991. Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to
thank Janet Cooper Alexander, Steven Bahls, Norwood Beveridge, Jill Fisch, Joseph
Grundfest, Reimer Kraakman, Mark Ramseyer, and Steve Thel for helpful comments.
1 As one author recently described, limited liability can distort the economic incentives
of tort law:
Tort liability, and product liability in particular, has been justified by the econonuc
incentives such liability places on actors to take the proper amount of care to prevent
harm to others. Recently, a number of writers have pointed out that principles of limited
liability, found most prominently in corporate law, undercut these incentives and indeed
may encourage corporations to engage in unduly risky activities.
David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Vlcim, and Creditors, 91 CoLUM. L. REv.
1565, 1565 (1991) (footnotes omitted). See also Henry Hansmann & Reimer Kraakman,
Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J 1879, 1880
(1991). This issue was also touched on briefly in Paul Halpern et al., An Econoac Analyss
of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. TOR. L.J. 117, 119 (1980), but that article
was primarily concerned with corporate contractual debts, rather than tort judgments. See
also PHiLLIP I. BLMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GRouPs: TORT, CONTRACr, AND
OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SuBsTANTVE LAw oF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY
CoRPoRATIoNs §§ 5.01-5.02, 8.01-16.04 (1987) (discussing veil-piercing and shareholder
liability m the context of parent-subsidiary relationships).
2 See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1880 ("Changes m technology,
knowledge, liability rules, and procedures for mass tort litigation have for the first time
raised the prospect of tort claims that exceed the net worth of even very large
corporations."); Leebron, supra note 1.
3 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1896.
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Under their scheme, tort liability would attach to shareholders of both closely-
held and publicly-traded corporations when it appeared likely that claims
exceeding the value of the corporation would be filed. 4 Shareholders under
their plan would not, however, be jointly and severally liable, as most previous
commentators have assumed, 5 but would be liable only for the share of
corporate tort debt proportional to their share of equity ownership.6
Although it is unlikely that all advocates of limited liability have been
swayed by the arguments of Professors Hansmann and Kraakman, 7 responses
to their proposal have for the most part addressed not the desirability of
unlimited liability but its feasibility. 8 Their article has prompted two lengthy
replies,9 each arguing, for different reasons, that a pro rata unlimited liability
system would not work. Professor Janet Cooper Alexander takes a procedural
approach, contesting the claim of Hansmann and Kraakman that unlimited
liability could be imposed by the states individually Professor Alexander
contends that if a single state unposed unlimited liability, corporate tort
4 Id. at 1896-98. The specific statement of the rule by Hausmann and Kraakman is that
liability would attach "when the corporation's management first became aware that, with
lugh probability, such claims would be filed." Id. at 1897. The liability date could, of
course, be no later than the date of the actual filing of claims. Id. To avoid the problem of
corporate liquidation to avoid tort liability, Hansman and Kraakman would also impose
liability if the corporation dissolved without leaving a contractual successor. Id. & n.48.
5 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89, 92 (1985); Halpern et al., supra note 1.
6 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1892-94.
7 Indeed, the recent statutory authorization m many states of limited liability companies
(LLCs), see, e.g., N.Y. LIM. LIAB. Co. LAw (McKinney Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, ch. 18 (1993 & Supp. 1994), suggests that if there is a national trend, it is toward
more limited liability, rather than less. The significance of the issues discussed m this article
is increased by this movement, though. As of this writing, three states, Massachussetts,
Vermont, and Hawaii, have not yet authorized LLCs. Dennis S. Karjala, Planning
Problem in the Limited Liability Company, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 455, 455 n.2 (1995). It is
unclear how torts committed by LLCs will be treated outside their states of creation. It is
possible that states m which LLCs are not authorized nught attempt to impose liability on
the members of out-of-state LLCs, and this article sheds light on whether such attempts
would succeed.
8 A recent student paper does contest the merits of Hansmann and Kraaknan's
proposal, however. See Michael P. Coffey, In Defense of Limited Liability: A Reply to
Hansmann and Kraalcnan, 1 GEo. MASON U. L. REv. 59 (1994).
9 Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural
Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1992); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of
Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387 (1992).
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creditors would find it difficult to enforce that liability due to jurisdictional' °
and choice-of-law" issues. Specifically, she argues that courts would be
unwilling either to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state shareholders or to apply
the unlimited-liability state's law to corporations chartered in other states.
Professor Joseph Grundfest takes a different tack. Relying m part on the
extension of Professor Alexander's arguments to the international arena, he
argues that, as a practical matter, unlimited shareholder liability would be
undermined by the ownership of risky equity outside the United States and the
creation of new derivative financial instruments that would effectively recreate
a limited-liability regime for U.S. investors. 12
The upshot of the responses by Professors Alexander and Grundfest is that
it is impossible, under current procedural law and in light of financial-market
innovation, for a state to impose a regime of unlimited shareholder liability.
This is, at least from one perspective, a surprising conclusion. Corporate torts
are made possible only by the investments of the corporation's shareholders. If
shareholder liability were unlimited, that substantive economic relationship
between shareholder and tort would be transparent; that is, there would be no
corporate veil. In its absence, it is unclear why there should be difficulty in
recognizing sufficient connection between shareholders' investment decisions
and corporate acts to satisfy jurisdictional and choice-of-law requirements.
Professors Alexander and Grundfest in effect argue that, regardless of the
liability rules of the states in which a corporation does business, its
shareholders can shield themselves with the corporate veil established by-for
Professor Alexander-the state of incorporation 13  or-for Professor
Grundfest-the country in which the shareholder resides. 14 I argue here that
10 Professor Alexander's jurisdictional arguments are discussed infra part Ill.
11 Professor Alexander's choice-of-law arguments are discussed infra part V.12 Professor Grundfest's arguments are discussed znfra part VI.
13 This is true explicitly of Professor Alexander's choice-of-law arguments, where she
contends that the law of the state of incorporation should prevail over the law of the state in
which the corporate tort was committed. See infra part V. It is also true implicitly of her
jurisdictional arguments, where she claims that a shareholder purposefully avails itself only
of the laws of the state of incorporation, and has no jurisdictionally significant contacts with
the states m which the corporation does business. See znfra parts M-IV.
14 As described in part VI infra, Professor Grundfest's financial-market arguments rely
primarily on the existence of a class of foreigu shareholders who are, as he puts it,
"attachment-proof." If a court m the United States, rejecting Professor Alexander's
arguments, issued an unlimited-liability judgment against a corporation's shareholders,
foreign shareholders would be attachment-proof only if courts in their own countries refused
to enforce the U.S. judgment. Such a refusal would presumably rely on a decision that
unlimited liability was against the foreign country's public policy. See infra part V.C.
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this view is plausible only if one remains wedded to the traditional conception
of the corporation as a limited-liability entity.
Professor Alexander, throughout her article, assumes that shareholders are
passive investors who cannot be charged with knowledge of, and hence
responsibility for, the acts of the corporations that they own. 15 There are two
reasons to think that this assumption is inaccurate.' 6 First, even under the
current limited-liability regime, many investors, including at least most
institutional investors, are quite aware of the business activities of the
corporations in which they invest, and of where those activities take place.
Second, and more important, if unlimited liability were instituted, shareholders
would become more knowledgeable regarding the business activities of the
corporations in which they invest. As will be argued below, 17 if shareholders
did in fact know of their corporation's activities in an unlimited-liability state,
that state should be able to obtain jurisdiction over them, even if the
corporation were chartered elsewhere. The choice-of-law question is perhaps a
more difficult one, but at least for publicly-held corporations' 8 the interests of
states in which the corporation does business are probably greater than those of
the state of incorporation. 19 That is especially so because unlimited-liability
judgments would be paid by the corporation's shareholders, not by the
corporation itself.
Professor Grundfest's assumptions are more theoretically plausible, but
they are also empirically unsupported. His arguments assume that there is some
class of shareholders for whom the possibility of an unlimited-liability
judgment would make no difference m their investment decisions. 20 Professor
15 Alexander, supra note 9, at 409. ("The shareholders' consent [to liability] could not be
implied from the corporation's decision to do business in the state for two reasons: First,
because the shareholders lack control over (and even knowledge of) the corporation's
activities, and second, because the shareholders' decision to purchase stock has no
connection to the forum state.").
16 These points are discussed further znfra part V.A.
17 See znfra part ill.
18 As I discuss znfra part V.B.2, I believe that the choice-of-law decision tilts more
toward the state of incorporation for closely-held corporations. Hence, for those
corporations I think that unlimited liability is less viable; for close corporations, I thnk that
the usual piercing-the-veil rules are a more appropriate avenue to determine shareholder
liability.
19 See infra part V.
2 0 See Grundfest, supra note 9, at 393 ("In the end, transaction costs m the capital
markets might increase [as a result of financial-market liability evasion techniques], but
stock market prices would not fall to reflect the risks associated with proportionate
liability.") (footnote omitted). Aside from the questionable proposition that unlimited-
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Grundfest would claim that such shareholders could be investors from other
countries whose courts would not enforce U.S. unlimited-liability judgments.
But this claim, in turn, relies on two other, related assumptions: that it will be
certain that an unlimited-liability judgment could not be enforced against those
investors, and that they will therefore be willing to pay no less for equity that
might subject them to such a judgment than for equity that would not. In fact,
though, the enforceability of an unlimited-liability judgment is unlikely to be so
clear. Enforceability would vary over time, from corporation to corporation,
and from country to country, and a shareholder could only avoid enforcement
so long as she kept her assets out of reach of the United States courti.21
Furthermore, even if a foreign investor could indeed avoid enforcement, she
could only sell her risky shares (at full price) to others who were similarly
unreachable.22 Professor Grundfest neglects these risks and burdens that would
fall on investors in risky equity, yet they would not be borne by those investors
for free, so unlimited liability would still be effective.23
The remainder of this article is divided into six parts. Part 11 sets the stage
for the rest of the article by reviewing earlier experiences with excess
shareholder liability, which neither the courts nor the financial markets have
found as unmanageable as Professors Alexander and Grundfest suggest. Part III
addresses Professor Alexander's jurisdictional concerns and concludes that they
are overstated; the voluntary nature of the decisions of shareholders to invest in
particular corporations doing business in unlimited-liability states would be
sufficient to subject shareholders to jurisdiction. Jurisdiction would, however,
require that shareholders were aware that they could be subject to unlimited
liability, and Part IV describes why and how shareholders would in fact gain
liability risk would not lower stock prices, see infra part VJ.A, the increase in transaction
costs to which Professor Grundfest refers would itself lower the price of risky equity.
Assume that investors believed that a particular risky stock was, if free of unlimited-liability
risk, worth a particular price. If those investors, to make that stock truly free of liability
risk, were also required to purchase the liability-evasion mechanisms that Professor
Grundfest describes, they would lower the price that they were willing to pay for the stock
by the cost of those evasion mechansms.
21 See infra parts VI.A.1-2.
22 See infra part VI.A.3.
23 It is true that its effectiveness nght be only partial. To the extent that shareholders'
assets were in fact unreachable, the compensatory goals of unlimited liability would not be
met. To the extent, though, that the price of risky equity was reduced by the risks and
burdens to investors of holding it, the reduced price both would have the risk-deterrng
effect on corporate management desired by advocates of unlimited-liability and would cause
more investors whose assets were reachable to buy, thus indirectly serving the
compensatory goal as well.
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that awareness. Part V discusses the more difficult inter-jurisdictional issues.
Domestically, these issues include the limitations of the dormant commerce
clause and of choice-of-law more generally; internationally, the choice-of-law
question must take into account the difficulties of enforcing an unlimited-
liability judgment that could be inconsistent with a foreign country's policies.
Part VI then describes Professor Grundfest's financial-market arguments and
explains why there is reason to think that the financial markets would not in
fact enable shareholders to avoid unlimited liability. Part VII offers some final
observations.
II. SHAREHOLDER LIABILrTY IN PRACTICE
Excess shareholder liability is not unprecedented. 24 Until 1931, California
imposed unlimited, pro rata liability on shareholders of both its own and other
states' corporations, 25 making California law at the time quite similar to that
proposed by Professors Hansmann and Kraakman. Although California's law
was unusual, other forms of more limited shareholder liability have been
common: double or triple shareholder liability (i.e., liability for an amount
equal to the par value of a shareholder's shares, or twice that value for triple
24 For a general description of excess-liability statutes, see BLUMBERG, supra note 1,
§§ 2.01-2.02.
25 Califorma's provision for unlimited liability was repealed as part of a complete
superseding of California's corporation law m 1931. See Act effective Aug. 14, 1931, ch.
862, § 1, 1931 Cal. Stat. 1762, 1763. Prior to its repeal, the unlimited-liability provision
read as follows:
Each stockholder of a corporation is mdividually and personally liable for such
proportion of all its debts and liabilities contracted or incurred during the time he was a
stockholder as the amount of stock or shares owned by him bears to the whole of the
subscribed hapital stock or shares of the corporation. Any creditor of the corporation
may institute joint or several actions against any of its stockholders, for the proportion
of his clam payable by each, and in such action the court must ascertain the proportion
of the clam or debt for which each defendant is liable, and a several judgment may be
rendered against each, in conformity therewith. The liability of each stockholder of
a corporation formed under the laws of any other state or territory of the United States,
or of any foreign country, and doing business within this state, is the same as the
liability of a stockholder of a corporation created under the constitution and laws of this
state.
Act of Mar. 20, 1905, ch. 339, § 1, 1905 Cal. Stat. 396, 396 (codified as CAL. Cirv. CODE
§ 322 (Deering 1923)) (repealed 1931).
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liability) was imposed by many states in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, 26 double liability for bank shareholders was a matter of both federal
and state law into the mid-twentieth century,27 and unlimited shareholder
liability for unpaid employee wages persisted into the twentieth century, and
survives still in New York and Wisconsin.28 Moreover, individual companies
have always been able to operate with unlimited liability, and at least one
publicly traded company, American Express, did so until 1965.29 These
excess-liability arrangements presented no particular difficulties, either in the
courts or in the financial markets.
The*California corporate unlimited-liability law was considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court on several occasions. In Thomas v. Matthiessen,30 the Court
faced an attempt by a citizen of California to recover from a citizen of New
York on debts owed by an Arizona corporation in which the New Yorker was
a shareholder.31 Despite the defendant shareholder's explicit agreement with
the corporation that he would not be liable for corporate debts, and a corporate
charter provision to that effect, the Court concluded the California law could be
applied. The Court said that "a [corporate charter] provision exempting the
stockholder [from liability] alongside of one authorizing the doing of business
elsewhere cannot ... be deemed an attempt to override the law of the place
where the business is to be done." 32 The Court pointed to the shareholder's
explicit assent to the corporation's business in California, and held that by that
assent the shareholder submitted himself to liability:
When the defendant authorized [business in California], he could not
avoid the consequences by saying that he did not foresee or intend, or that he
26 BLUMBERG, supra note 1, § 2.01.2.
2 7 ld. § 2.01.3; see also Jonathan R. Maeey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of
Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 31 (1992).
28 Id. § 2.01.4. The current New York law provides for joint and several liability with
contribution of the ten largest shareholders of corporations whose shares are neither listed
on a national exchange nor regularly quoted in over-the-counter markets. N.Y. Bus. CoRp.
LAW § 630(a) (McKinney 1986). The 'Wisconsin law provides for pro rata liability of all
shareholders for up to six months of unpaid employee service. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.0622 (2)(b) (West 1992).
29 peter Z. Grossman, The Market for Shares of Compames with Unlimited Liability:
The Case of Amencan &press, 24 . LEGAL STUD. 63, 65, 72-75 (1995).
30 232 U.S. 221 (1914).
3 1 The California statute permitted creditors to bring suit against shareholders directly.
See supra note 25; see also, e.g., Morrow v. Superior Court, 1 P. 354, 354-55 (Cal. 1883)
(en bane).
32 7homas, 232 U.S. at 234.
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forbade them. He knew that California had laws and he took lus nsk of what
they might be, when, as we must hold, he gave his assent to doing business
there.3 3
Thomas appears quite clearly to say that a state can impose its own
shareholder liability policy on even foreign corporations doing business in the
state. The only condition on which the Court appeared to rely was the
shareholder's knowledge of the California unlimited-liability statute.34 The
Court assumed for the purpose of its decision that "a provision for doing
business in other States without any express reference to the possible difference
in their law would not be enough to change the rule [of limited liability]." 35
The Court found liability, though, by concluding that the shareholder's
intention that the corporation do business in California, together with his
apparent awareness of California law, was sufficient to bind him. Professor
Alexander umplies that the Court in Thomas relied on an explicit assent by the
shareholders to the California law, but that is not so;36 the shareholder in
33 Id. at 234-35. The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the same law in
Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. 144 (1901), in which it relied on the corporate charter's explicit
provision for doing business m Califorma as an express contractual undertaking to apply
California's laws. Id. at 150. The Court said that "[plarties may contract with special
reference to carrying on business m separate States, and when they make an express
contract therefor the business transacted in each of the States will be affected by the law of
those States, and may result m a difference of liability." Id. at 151.
34 There are several suggestions in the Court's opinion that the defendant's explicitness
in seeking to be free from personal liability was a response to the California law. See
Thomas, 232 U.S. at 233 ("The Oak Knoll is near Pasadena in California, and the
defendant and his associates intended the corporation to have the power to build and
manage a hotel in that neighborhood and expected that it would do so, but intended their
liability to be controlled by the laws of Arizona."); see also id. at 234 ("In this case the
defendant expressed in writing his wish that the corporation should set up a hotel in
California. It is true that he also desired and stipulated that he should be free from personal
charge.").
35 Id. at 234.
36 To reach this conclusion, Professor Alexander says that the Court "relied on a pre-
incorporation shareholder agreement to find that the shareholders had 'give[n] ... assent
[to be bound by California law] outside of the instrument of incorporation.'" Alexander,
supra note 9, at 412 n.121 (quoting Thomas, 232 U.S. at 234). What the Court actually
said, though, was that a shareholder "may give such assent outside of the instrument of
incorporation and be bound by it." Thomas, 232 U.S. at 234. The Court then observed that
the shareholder did not in fact do that, but instead "desired and stipulated that he should be
free from personal charge." d The Court explicitly rejected the shareholder's desires,
stating that those desires were "merely the not infrequent occurrence of a party bringing
about the facts and attempting to prohibit their legal consequence." Id.
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Thomas had in fact emphatically refused to assent to the California law, but the
Court refused to allow him to set his own terms for benefiting from the
corporation's business in California.37
77wmas presented only a choice-of-law question, not a jurisdictional one,
because the creditor brought suit in the shareholder's home state of New York.
The Supreme Court apparently has not been faced with an attempt by a creditor
to obtain jurisdiction in an excess-liability state over an out-of-state shareholder
of a corporation incorporated elsewhere. The Court has, however, considered
an attempt to enforce an excess-liability judgment against a shareholder over
whom the court rendering the judgment did not have jurisdiction. In Chandler
v. Peketz,38 the Supreme Court considered a Colorado shareholder's
jurisdictional challenge to an attempt by the receiver of a Minnesota
corporation to enforce a Minnesota judgment that the receiver had obtained
under Minnesota's double-liability statute. The Court rejected the challenge,
observing that it had previously considered the Minnesota statute and held that
shareholders were bound by a judgment under it:
[The judgment] is thus conclusive, although the stockholder may not have been
a party to the suit m which it was made or notified that an assessment was
contemplated, as the order is not in the nature of a personal judgment against
him and he must be deemed, by virtue of his relation to the corporation and the
obligation assumed with respect to its debts, to be represented by it in the
proceeding .... 39
Chandler thus adopts an approach akin to that of a class action, in which
an absent party can be bound by a judgment if she was adequately represented
in the proceeding in which the judgment was issued.40 The Court explicitly
said that "the order levying the assessment is made conclusive as to all matters
relating to the amount and propriety thereof, and the necessity therefor"; 4i that
is, the judgment was conclusive as to matters regarding which the shareholder
could be deemed to have been adequately represented by the corporation in the
Minnesota proceeding.42 The Court emphasized that, as with a defendant class
37 See supra note 36.
38 297 U.S. 609 (1936).
39 Id. at 611 (citing Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907); Converse v.
Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912); Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U.S. 652, 660 (1914); Marin v.
Augedahl, 247 U.S. 142 (1918)).
40 Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
41 Oand!er, 297 U.S. at 610-11.
42 The Court also pointed out that notice of the heanng m the Minnesota action had
been mailed to all of the corporation's shareholders. Id. at 611.
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action,43 the shareholder "[was] not precluded from showing that he [was] not
a stockholder, or [was] not the holder of as many shares as [was] alleged, ...
or [had] any other defense personal to himself."44 Chandler thus suggests that a
similar class procedure could be used to adjudicate the pro rata liability of
shareholders in any forum in which jurisdiction over satisfactory
representatives of the shareholder class could be obtained. 45
Thomas and Chandler suggest that shareholder liability could be a
workable plan, and empirical evaluations of excess shareholder liability bear
that suggestion out. Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller conducted
an extensive investigation of double liability for bank shareholders, 46 and they
concluded that the system was quite effective.47 Despite the expected problems
of enforcing liability assessments in foreign states and of litigating against
widely dispersed shareholders, Professors Macey and Miller report that over
the lifetime of the federal double liability rule, 50.8% of each dollar assessed
was collected. 48 That return ratio seems sufficient to conclude that the program
was effective, and, indeed, Macey and Miller note that states with double
liability had generally lower bank capital ratios than states that did not,
suggesting that bank creditors "believed they could obtain repayment of some
or all of their deposits by means of assessment in the event a bank failed." 49
The preceding paragraphs all address only the viability of unlimited (or
excess) liability in the courts; opponents of unlimited liability also argue that it
would have undesirable effects in the financial markets. Again, however, there
is an empirical study that suggests otherwise. Peter Grossman has examined the
trading activity in shares of American Express,50 which until 1965 was
organized as an unlitited-liability New York joint stock firm.51 Grossman
43 See infra part I.B.
44 Chander, 297 U.S. at 611.
45 As discussed infra part III.B, defendant class actions are used in this way m
shareholder assessment proceedings.
46 Macey & Miller, supra note 27.
47 1 am referring here to the system's effectiveness in recovering assessed losses from
shareholders. Some of the conclusions of Professors Macey and Miller regarding the
double-liability system's effectiveness m preventing losses have been challenged. See
Howell E. Jackson, Losses from National Bank Failures During the Great Depression: A
Response to Professors Macey and Miller, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 919 (1993); Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders: A Look at the New
Data, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 933 (1993) (responding to Professor Jackson's critique).
48 Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 55-56.
49 Id. at 60.
50 Grossman, supra note 29.
51 Id. at 65, 72-75.
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found that there was a regular market for American Express shares, with no
suggestion of a concentration of shares in the hands of wealthy (or poor)
shareholders, 52 or in the hands of non-New York or non-U.S. investors. 53 He
also found no indication that American Express's unlimited liability produced a
discount in its share prices, even though at one time the company was sued for
an amount of twice its net assets; 54 Grossman concludes that shareholders,
perhaps unjustifiably, valued the risk of insolvency at zero. 55 Hence, where the
cases discussed earlier suggest that unlimited liability could be effective when
companies do fail, the American Express story indicates that unlimited liability
need not present problems for companies that do not.
Admittedly, none of the experiences described above prove that unlimited
liability would work. Both Thomas and Chandler preceded more recent
decisions by the Supreme Court on choice of law and personal jurisdiction, as
did the effective period of bank double liability,56 and enforcement of the
potential liability of American Express shareholders was apparently never
required.57 As will be shown below, though, Thomas and Chandler are quite
consistent with the Court's later decisions, and both cases have been cited more
recently by lower courts with no suggestion that their holdings have become
less vital. 58 Moreover, the article by Professors Macey and Miller points out
52 Id. at 75-77.
53 Id. at 81-82.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 78-83.
56 After 1935, national banks were permitted to opt out of double liability after six
months notice, and most states abolished double liability by 1944. Macey & Miller, supra
note 27, at 38-39. International Shoe was decided m 1945. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See znfra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
57 Grossman indicates that at one point early in its existence American Express "faced
a shareholder audit," but he does not mention any assessment. Grossman, supra note 29, at
73.
58 As discussed znfra in the text accompanying notes 80-81, the Delaware Court of
Chancery has recently relied on Chandler. Thomas was cited in Joncas v. Krueger, 213
N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1973), which held that a Wisconsin statute making shareholders pro rata
liable for unpaid debts to employees for up to six months services applied to foreign
corporations. The court treated the question largely as one of statutory interpretation, but it
did reject an argument that public policy prevents applying the law to shareholders of
foreign corporations: "[Sluch policy finds no valid basis respecting the shareholders of
foreign corporations doing business in Wisconsin; such shareholders should not be treated
differently than shareholders of a domestic corporation. Wisconsin can impose such liability
as a condition of doing business in this state." Id. at 3 (citing Thomas and Pinney). But see
Armstrong v. Dyer, 198 N.E. 551 (N.Y. 1935) (affirming, without opinion, an order of the
appellate division dismissing a similar claim under a New York statute that was similar, but
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that the courts can be quite flexible and sensible in dealing with the various
problems that arise with shareholder liability,5 9 suggesting that one should be
skeptical of theoretical arguments claining that shareholder liability cannot
work.
Il. JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT SHAREHOLDERS
As Professor Alexander points out, imposition of unlimited liability on out-
of-state shareholders does present significant jurisdictional questions. However,
her analysis of these questions is limited to several Supreme Court cases, 60
each of which is factually very different from the unlimited shareholder liability
situation. If anything is clear in this area, it is that the jurisdictional issue is
very fact-specific. 61 Therefore, it is more helpful to examine how courts have
treated cases that are factually similar to the one at hand, rather than to attempt
to extrapolate from very different (though more authoritative) cases of the
Supreme Court. This is not to say, of course, that the Supreme Court cases are
irrelevant; it is only to say that to the extent that they present different facts,
they can only be used as a source of general principles, not as a source of
specific decision rules.
The first section below outlines the general rules that the Supreme Court
has established for the personal jurisdiction inquiry. The second section
describes how these rules might be applied if a corporation's shareholders were
sued as a class. In a class action, it is possible, if not likely, that a tort creditor
would need to establish personal jurisdiction only over representative
shareholders, or perhaps only over the corporation itself. The third section
assumes, in contrast, that jurisdiction would be required over all corporate
shareholders individually. This section points out, though, that courts have
typically found jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who knowingly
assumed liability for debts related to the forum, even where the defendants had
little other contact with the forum. I suggest therefore that, assuming that a
provided for joint and several liability); cf. infra note 198 (discussing Joncas's statement that
to exclude foreign corporations from the Wisconsm law could deny employees of those
corporations equal protection). Other examples of the application of state statutes applied to
foreign corporations are given in Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Internal Affairs Doctrine:
The Proper Law of a Corporation, 44 Bus. LAW. 693,703-09 (1989).
59 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 39-55.
60 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 394-401.
61 See, e.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 485-86 (1985) ("We
... reject any talismanic jurisdictional formulas; 'the facts of each case must [always] be
weighed' m determining whether personal jurisdiction would comport with 'fair play and
substantial justice.") (quoting Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978)).
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corporation's shareholders knew of their potential unlimited liability,
jurisdiction would similarly be found over them. Finally, the fourth section
discusses the Supreme Court cases relied on by Professor Alexander and shows
how the Court's statements in those cases are entirely consistent with
jurisdiction over shareholders.
A. Personal Jurisdiction: Fairness and Federalism
The power of a state's courts over those who are not residents of that state
is limited by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The basic
definition of those limits remains that set out by the Supreme Court in
Intenational Shoe Co. v. Washington:62 "[D]ue process requires ... that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personwn, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
.... "63 "Minimum contacts" remains the formal label applied to the
jurisdictional test, but the intervening fifty years have brought substantive
elaborations on the test, and its modem interpretation has been described by the
Court as follows:
The concept of minimum contacts . can be seen to perform two related, but
distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating m a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the
States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on
them by their status as coequal sovereigns m a federal system.64
It is through these two "fairness" and "federalism" elements, and their familiar
"fair play and substantial justice" 65 and "purposeful availment" 66 tests, that the
due process test is now usually applied.
The fairness element predates International Shoe, which cited several
earlier cases in holding that an in personam judgment against a defendant not
physically present in the forum state must not "offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'" 67 The primary concern is the burden placed
62 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6 3 Id. at 316.
64 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 291-92 (1980).
65 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
6 6 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
6 7 Internationa Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
'1940)).
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on a defendant by requiring him to litigate in the forum state. 68 However, as
will be discussed below, 69 in the case of shareholder liability the burden of
defending may not fall on the shareholders at all. Instead, the corporation itself
might be required to defend the initial suit regarding the acts on which liability
depends, and later suits against shareholders might be limited to the issue of
their status as shareholder. In that case, the fairness element would not present
a jurisdictional obstacle to unlimited liability.
The federalism element has been variously defined by the Supreme Court
as one that the defendant must have "'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,'" 70 or as one that the
defendant must have "'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the
forum." 71 It is not, however, necessary that a defendant must have itself
conducted activities m the forum state. As the Court said in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,72 if the cause of action "arises from the efforts
of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for
its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of
those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of
injury to its owner or to others." 73 As will be seen below, it is this test on
which the jurisdictional issue here hinges.
B. Pursuing Shareholders Through a Defendant Class Action
An action to enforce unlimited shareholder liability would almost certainly
be brought against either the corporate tortfeasor or a class consisting of its
shareholders, or against both. Although Professors Hansmann and Kraakman
do not specify whether they would require tort creditors to bring suit against
the corporation, it would be logical to do so. Allowing creditors to pursue
68 World-Wde Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that "the burden on the
defendant, while always a primary concern," is to be considered m relation to other
factors). Tis burden is necessarily a function of the practical realities of communication
and transportation. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)
("[Mlodern transportation and commnumcation have made it much less burdensome for a
party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."); Hanson,
357 U.S. at 251 ("[Progress in commumcations and transportation has made the defense of
a suit m a foreign tribunal less burdensome.").
69 See infra part lIM.B.
7 0
.World-Wde Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
71 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).
72 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
73 1d. at 297 (emphasis added).
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shareholders individually, as the California unlimited-liability law did, would
give rise to needless duplication of effort and to unfairness. Moreover,
creditors would no doubt prefer to resolve as many issues as possible in a
single proceeding. The question then becomes whether the creditor would be
required to establish jurisdiction over all of the corporate shareholders.
Although Professor Alexander argues that personal jurisdiction would be
required over each defendant in a class sued for. damages, 74 other
commentators believe that jurisdiction over the named representatives of the
class would be sufficient. 75 Some of this commentary predates the Supreme
Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 76 but the Court in Shutts
reaffirmed its earlier holding that "a 'class' or 'representative' suit was an
exception to the rule that one could not be bound by judgment in personam
unless one was made fully a party in the traditional sense." 77 Although Shutts
revolved a plaintiff class, rather than a defendant class, it did not suggest that
the rules for the two cases differed. 78 Moreover, in its discussion of the reasons
74 Alexander, supra note 9, at 406 ("Due process would almost certainly require,
however, that each defendant in an action for damages have inimum contacts with the
forum state, even if sued as part of a defendant class.").
75 See, e.g., 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CoNTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACrIONS §
4.51, at 4-200 (3d ed. 1992) ("Because a class action, involving either a plaintiff or
defendant class, is a representative action on behalf of absent class members, personal
jurisdiction over all class members is not required to reach a binding judgment as to the
common issues decided in the class action.") (footnote omitted); Barry M. Wolfson,
Defendant Qass Actions, 38 010 ST. LJ. 459, 461-62 (1977) ("An analysis of the
historical development of the defendant class action ... reveals that, assuming adequate
representation, this action is an exception to the general due process mandate.") (footnote
omitted); cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41(2) (1980) (providing that "[a]
person represented by a party to an action is bound by the judgment even though the person
himself does not have notice of the action, is not served with process, or is not subject to
service of process"); One commentator has said that such a conclusion is necessary.
[Diefendant class actions would generally be unpossible if courts had to obtain personal
jurisdiction over every class member, instead of just the named defendant, m order to
bid the entire class. Hansberry v. Lee resolves this tension by establishing that a class
action may bind absent parties consistently with due process only if their interests
receive adequate representation.
Note, Defendant CassActons, 91 HARV. L. REy. 630, 638 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
76 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
7 7
.Tuus, 472 U.S. at 808 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1940) (citing
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878))).
78 But see znfra note 88.
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why the jurisdictional requirements for absent members of a plaintiff class are
relaxed relative to those of (nonclass) defendants, the Court focused on the
burdens of defending against a suit in the forum state,79 burdens which would
not be faced by an absent shareholder defendant who was represented either by
the corporation or by representative shareholders.
This is, in fact, how suits for shareholder assessment are currently handled:
Suit is brought against the corporation to determine the common obligation of
shareholders, and then shareholders are pursued individually for their portions
of that common obligation. The Delaware Court of Chancery quite recently
approved such a procedure with the following comments:
Imagine a case m which a corporate receiver petitions a court m the corporate
domicile for an order adjudicating that an assessment against holders of stock is
appropriate and fixing its amount. The receiver then takes her judgment to a
foreign jurisdiction in which a shareholder who was not a party to the first
action resides, and seeks to enforce it m the courts of that state. In such cases,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, even though the first judgment
creates no in personam liability, it conclusively does establish the rights and
obligations of corporate stock. What is left open is the question whether the
defendant in the second action is a "shareholder" who is therefore liable.8 0
Following the Court of Chancery's reasoning, then, a plaintiff would need
only obtain jurisdiction over the corporation, which would be possible in the
state in which the tort was committed under typical long-arm tort jurisdiction,
and could then pursue the corporation's shareholders without re-litigating the
underlying liability. This is exactly the procedure that the Supreme Court
approved in Chandler v. Peketz, as was discussed above.81 Although Chandler
was not technically a class action m the modem sense, because it preceded the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was a representative suit,
and the Court decided it using the same language that it has used for class
actions.
Furthermore, as Chandler suggests, whether a judgment against a
corporation would be preclusive against its shareholders is not solely dependent
on modem class-action procedures. Under an unlimited-liability regime, a
judgment of liability against a corporation could be preclusive against its
shareholders if they simply had notice of the action that produced that
judgment. There are three analogous circumstances that suggest that such
79 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808.
80 Hynson v. Drummond Coal Co., Inc., 601 A.2d 570, 577 (Del. Ch. 1991) (Allen,
C.) (citing, among other cases, Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936)).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 38-45.
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preclusion could arise. First, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments says that a
judgment against a corporation will be preclusive against its shareholders "[i]f
a relationship exists between a corporation and.. stockholder . such as
that of ... indemnitee and indemnitor ... , from which preclusive effects
follow under rules governing that relationship." 8 2 The Restatement further
provides that in an indemnity arrangement, when suit is brought against the
indemnitee, and "the indemnitor is given reasonable notice of the action and an
opportunity to assume or participate in its defense," the indemnitor will be
estopped from disputing the existence or extent of the liability. 83 Second, even
if shareholders were not considered indemnitors,8 4 but guarantors, there would
still be preclusive effect, though it might be somewhat less. The current
tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship states that a judgment
against a primary obligor creates only a rebuttable presumption of the primary
obligor's liability in a later action against the secondary obligor 8s Third, the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments states that in the related partnership
context, a judgment against one partner will be binding on others if the second
partner "controlled or participated m controlling the defense of the action, or
was given notice of an opportunity to defend the action." 8 6
82 RESTATEVMW (SECOND) OFIUDGMENTS § 59(1) (1980).
83 Id § 57. "The requisites of the notice to be given by the mdemnitee may be
specified by contract or by law or by a combination of both." Id. § 57 cmt. e. It is also
worth noting the Restatement's view that a judgment against a corporation will have
preclusive effects against its shareholders in the case of "[a] judgment assessing a
stockholder... of a corporation for payment of an obligation of the corporation... if the
proceeding leading to the assessment provided adequate notice to hun individually or
adequate representation of his interests m accordance with §§ 41 and 42." Id. § 59(4)
(emphasis added). Section 41 of the Restatement sets out the rules for class actions, but the
statement just quoted appears to suggest that sufficient notice is an alternative to the class
action procedure m the corporate context.
84 Shareholders probably would be mdemnitors under the definition in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, which provides that "[ain mdemnitor is one who is liable for a loss
that is initially charged to another, the mdennitee." Id. § 57 cint. a.85 RESTATEMEN (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 62(2) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1994).
861RESTATET (SECOND) OF JUDMErS § 60(b)(ji) (1980). The Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws concurs:
A general partner may be said to do business in each state where the
partnership does business since this business is carried on in his behalf. If a statute
provides that when a partnership does business in the state an action may be maintained
against the partners as to causes of action arising from this business, the state may
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The point here is not that shareholders in an unlimited-liability regime
would necessarily be treated precisely as mdemnitors, guarantors, or partners.
As is discussed below,8 7 there are good reasons to consider the specific goals
of corporate law in determining exactly how to treat shareholders under
unlimited liability. Such shareholders would, however, share some of the
characteristics of all of the relationships discussed above, and it is thus
reasonable, in the absence of more direct information, to look to those
analogous relationships. Doing so suggests that personal jurisdiction over every
shareholder might not be necessary.
Even if jurisdiction over each shareholder in a defendant class were
necessary, and Shutts does contain some language that suggests that the
Supreme Court might treat defendant classes differently from plaintiff classes, 88
render a valid judgment through its courts against the general partners provided that
it accords them reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op CONFLICT OF LAWS § 40 cmt. e (1969).
Professor Alexander attempts to evade the import of these Restatement views, citing the
comment just quoted and claiming (1) that "j]unsdiction over the partnership does not...
automatically confer jurisdiction over the partners individually," Alexander, supra note 9, at
401, and (2) that "[a] judgment against the partnership in the firm name is not automatically
enforceable against the partners," id. at 401 n.68. It is important to note that neither of her
statements demes that a judgment against one partner is binding on other partners with
notice of the action, the point of both of the Restatemtent quotations. That rule makes her
statements of very limited importance. As for the first, if judgment over one partner can be
made binding over the others simply by providing them with notice of the action, there is no
need to obtain jurisdiction over them. (In any event, the first sentence of the Restatement
quotation above suggests that there would be no constitutional difficulty with a state's
assertion of jurisdiction over the partners on the basis of the partnership's business in the
forum state.) Similar considerations apply to Professor Alexander's second statement. If one
can bind all partners in an action against one, a sensible plaintiff would sue individual
partners, even m states in which the partnership could be sued in the firm name.
87 See infra part V.B.2.
88 As described in the text accompanying notes 76-79 supra, the Court in Shutts
focused more on the differences between individual and class defendants, rather than on the
differences between defendants and plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the Court also said that "[alan
out-of-state defendant summoned by a plaintiff is faced with the full powers of the forum
State to render judgment against it." Shuts, 472 U.S. at 808. Although other of the Court's
statements suggest that it was primarily concerned about the possibility that a defendant
could be subject to a default judgment, see id. at 809 ("In sharp contrast to the predicament
of a defendant haled into an out-of-state forum, the plaintiffs in this suit were not haled
anywhere to defend themselves upon pain of a default judgment."), which would not be an
issue in a class action, where the defendants would be represented by a class representative,
the implications of Shutts for defendant class actions are uncertain.
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it still seems likely that proceeding by means of a class action would satisfy the
fairness element of the jurisdictional test. The fairness requirement, as
discussed above,89 seeks to avoid placing unreasonable burdens on defendants,
and Shutts observes that the burdens on class members are considerably less
than those on individual litigants. 90 Thus, a tort creditor, by proceeding against
shareholders as a class, could probably avoid imposing on the shareholders any
unreasonable burden in defending themselves. The creditor could then establish
jurisdiction by showing that the federalism element was met, i.e., that the
shareholders had purposefully availed themselves of activities in the forum
state.91 As the next section demonstrates, such a showing would be quite
possible.
C. Substantive Liability as a Basis for Jurisdiction
Professor Alexander overstates her case when she says that "[a]
defendant's potential liability is not a factor in determining whether a court has
personal jurisdiction over her." 92 Liability in itself is not sufficient to create
jurisdiction, but a defendant's knowing assumption of potential liability in a
particular jurisdiction establishes a relationship with that jurisdiction that may
be sufficient to do so. Professor Alexander overlooks this possibility, perhaps
because she looks only at circumstances in which a liability relationship derives
at least in part from one party's control over another; where liability is based
on control, it is not surprising that, as Professor Alexander concludes, it is "the
out-of-state defendant's control over in-state activities [that] explains why there
is personal jurisdiction over him." 93 However, if one looks further, to cases in
which liability is not based on control, it is clear that jurisdiction is possible
there as well. The discussion below shows, first, that little information
regarding jurisdiction can be derived from fact situations that also present
control issues, and, second, that circumstances in which liability is present and
control absent also permit jurisdiction.
1. The Limited Relevance of Control Corporate Veil-Piercing
89 See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
90 See Shuts, 472 U.S. at 808-09.
91 See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
92 Alexander, supra note 9, at 394 (footnote omitted). Later m her article, Professor
Alexander states the law more accurately: "Substantive liability does not automatically
confer personal jurisdiction." Id. at 400.
93 Id. at 401.
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In seeking cases analogous to unlimited shareholder liability, it seems at
first glance that the most logical choice would be to look, as Professor
Alexander does, 94 at cases involving corporate veil-piercing. Piercing the
corporate veil does, after all, impose liability on the corporate shareholders.
The problem with this approach, however, is that the background rule in veil-
piercing cases is one of limited liability, so that some special circumstance must
be present to pierce the veil. Most veil-piercing cases, as Professor Alexander
points out,95 apply some form of an "alter ego" or "instrumentality" theory of
veil-piercing, under both of which the test is whether the corporation is truly an
independent entity or is merely a tool controlled by its shareholder(s). 96
Because shareholder liability exists only if this control-based test Ls met, and
jurisdiction over the shareholders becomes an important issue only if liability is
present, jurisdiction in these circumstances will be present only if the
shareholders control the corporation, just as Professor Alexander argues. 97
The problem with this argument, though, is that it conflates the liability
and jurisdictional inquiries. 98 Because liability can itself be a factor in
94 See ad. at 401 & n.67. Professor Alexander takes this approach in part because
Professors Hansmann and Kraakman do. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at
1922 & n.110.
95 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 401.
96 See generally STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCaNG THE CORPORATE VEiL § 1.03(4)
(1991).
97 Alexander, supra note 9, at 401. Actually, this statement of the situation is not
entirely accurate, because some courts analyze the jurisdictional issue independently of the
liability one. See, e.g., Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd., 28 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.
1994) ("A determination to pierce the corporate veil does not necessarily answer the
question of a court's jurisdiction over the individuals behind the veil."); United Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1084-85 (1st Cir.
1992) ("The parties have focused singlemindedly on the strength of [the subsidiary's]
corporate veil as the linchpin of the jurisdictional inquiry. We deem it advisable to take a
step backward. While we are cognizant that a certain symbiosis exists between the
jurisdictional inquiry and the corporate inquiry, the inquiries are separate and
unequivalent."); but see Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co., 707 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Or. Ct.
App. 1985) ("In deciding whether [a shareholder] should be required to appear and answer
personally, the appropriate criteria are the same as those applied for the purpose of
imposing personal liability."). The fundamental point made in the text is still valid,
though-there is no reason to think that the jurisdictional test when shareholder liability is
normally limited would be the same one applied if liability were normally unlimited.
Breaking down a wall does not necessarily give the same result as if the wall never existed.
9 8 That is not to say that the veil-piercing cases treat the liability and jurisdictional
mquies the same. In fact, many of the cases treat them differently. See supra note 97. The
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determining whether jurisdiction is present, looking to cases m which liability
is normally absent, so that some special threshold must be passed to create
liability, is not enlightening. Put another way, there is no reason to expect that
the jurisdictional test that would apply if shareholder liability were unlimited
would be the same as the one applied currently, when liability is normally
limited.9 9 This will become more clear in the discussion below, 1°° where it is
shown that jurisdiction can depend on a defendant's knowledge and acceptance
of substantive liability in a forum state. A shareholder of a limited-liability
corporation has no expectation of liability for the debts of his corporation
point is that the jurisdictional question is likely to be treated differently in a case in which
liability is also in question than in one in which liability is certain.
9 9 Lea Brilmayer and Kathleen Paisley make a similar, but more general, point in their
article on the interrelationship ofjurisdictional issues and substantive legal relationships:
The substantive relations that enter into due process calculations are primarily a
matter of the law that creates the cause of action, usually state law. [Ihere are no a
priori or empircal theories that authoritatively connect local acts of one individual to
another individual outside the state or that categorize a series of activities as caused by a
single abstract entity such as a corporation or a conspiracy. Only normative theories
perform that function in law, and such theories are created by the states and not by the
limits contained in the federal constitution.
Lea Brilmayer & Kathleen Paisley, Personal Junsdiction and Substantive Legal Relations:
Corporations, Conspzracies, andAgency, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1, 25 (1986).
The Supreme Court made a somewhat analogous point in Cannon Manufaeturing Co.
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 330 (1925). It is sometimes suggested that Cannon rules
out the possibility of jurisdiction derived from a parent-subsidiary relationship, but that is
not so, or at least would not be so in an unlimited-liability regime. In Cannon the plaintiff
asserted jurisdiction over a Maine corporation, but had served process on the defendant's
Alabama subsidiary, apparently in North Carolina, where the action was brought. Whether
the Court viewed the issue as a constitutional or statutory one is not clear, but it described
the question as "simply whether the corporate separation carefully maintained must be
ignored in determining the existence of jurisdiction." Id. at 336 (emphasis added). It
concluded that it did not, and affirmed the dismissal of the action. The Court made very
clear, though, that its decision was made only on a formal basis, and that substantive
liability, had it existed, might have produced a different result: "There is here no attempt to
hold the defendant liable for an act or omission of its subsidiary or to enforce as against the
latter a liability of the defendant. Hence, cases concerning substantive rights ... have no
application." Id. at 337 (citing Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294 (1917);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490 (1918); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71 (1918); and United States v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 254
U.S. 255 (1920)).
100 See infra part lI.C.2.
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(regardless of whether, through veil-piercing, such liability is imposed), so
such a shareholder has no reason to expect to be haled into court where the
corporation does business. A shareholder of an unlimited-liability corporation,
in contrast, would know of his potential liability for the debts of the
corporation, and hence would know of his connection with the states in which
the corporation does business.
2. The Sufficiency of Liability
There are several relationships in which jurisdiction is sought over one
party based on that party's liability for the debt of another. The relationship of
that kind that seems most logical to consider here is partnership. But
partnership is not a useful analogy, for two reasons. First, individuals in a
partnership are formally agents of their partners, 1 1 which makes it difficult to
draw conclusions from the partnership's jurisdictional treatment to the proper
treatment in a liability-without-agency relationship. Second, because of this
agency relationship, a judgment against one partner is generally binding against
others who had notice of the action, as in a defendant class action; 1e hence,
personal jurisdiction over all of the partners is not necessary.1 3 The discussion
below concentrates specifically on two relationships in which jurisdiction has
been found purely based" on the acceptance of liability: guaranties and
insurance. Neither of these relationships involves any element of control, so
they provide a closer analogy to unlimited shareholder liability than do the veil-
piercing or partnership situations.
101 The Uniform Partnership Act states that each partner is the agent of his or her
partners for the purpose of the partnership business. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9(1)
(1914).
102 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
103 That is not to say that it is unavailable, though. See, e.g., In re Alexander Grant &
Co. Litigation, 110 F.R.D. 528, 532 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (observing that in an earlier
proceeding some of the 470 defendant partners had sought to have the action dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction, but that the court had concluded that "as Grant elected to
conduct itself as a partnership in Florida, the individual partners were subject to personal
jurisdiction in Florida."); Schroeder v. Raich, 278 N.W.2d 871, 875 (Wis. 1979) ("Raich, a
partner, may be said to be doing business in Wisconsin because the partnership does
business.m this state and partnership business is carried on in behalf of each partner.")
(citing RESTATEmENT (SECOND) op CONaxcT oF LAWS § 40 cmt. e (1969)); see also supra
note 86 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 56:815
UNLIMITED LLABILITY
a. Guaranties
A guarantor, one who "contracts to fulfill an obligation upon the default of
the principal obligor," 104 is a logical choice for comparison with a shareholder
subject to unlimited liability. Both stand in positions of secondary liability, the
guarantor to his principal obligor and the shareholder to the unlimited-liability
corporation. In some cases, in fact, the two circumstances collapse into one, as
when shareholders of close corporations guarantee the loans of their
corporations. 105 To the extent that the two circumstances differ, it seems that
the argument for jurisdiction is even stronger for an unlimited-liability
shareholder than for a guarantor, because a shareholder receives a share of the
profits of her corporation in the forum state, but a guarantor typically does
not. 106
Courts have generally been quite willing to find jurisdiction over non-
resident guarantors, using rationales that apply equally well to unlimited-
liability shareholders. The courts appear to require either of two related
conditions to find that a guarantor has "purposefully availed" itself of the law
of the forum state so as to establish jurisdiction. The first, which applies in
those jurisdictions that look primarily to the place designated for payment of
the guaranty, requires that the guaranty or the business to which it relates have
some significant connection with the forum state. The second, which applies in
jurisdictions that look more broadly at the entire guaranty transaction, requires
that the guarantor know that the obligation that he guarantees has connections
or effects in the forum state. Each of these approaches is discussed below.
The place-of-payment approach is used in the Second Circuit,107 and the
requirement that the business of the guaranty be connected to the forum is
demonstrated in a recent case from that court, A.L Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra
104 RF.SATEMENT (rHIRD) OF SURETYSHIP § 1 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1992).
105 Professor Leebron has suggested that the frequent requirement of contract creditors
for shareholder guarantees is itself a justification for using unlimited shareholder liability to
provide the same advantage to tort creditors. See Leebron, supra note 1, at 1630-32.
106 See infra note 112.
107 See, e.g., A.X Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1993)
("The guaranteeing of the Notes by [the non-resident defendant], including the promise to
make payment to a New York-based company m New York, constitute[d] '"some act by
which the defendant purposefully avail[ed] itself of the pnvilege of conducting activities
with the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and the protection of its laws."'") (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))).
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Bank.10 8 In A.I. Trade, the defendant guarantor argued, relying on an earlier
Second Circuit case, that the choice of New York as the place of payment for
its guaranty was an "unbargained-for accommodation" and did not constitute a
purposeful availment of New York laws.' 09 However, m the earlier case the
court had relied on the fact that "neither the business of the syndicate nor of the
note had a substantial connection" with the forum state, n 0 and the court
rejected a similar argument in A.I. Trade, observing that there were good
reasons for the guarantee to be payable in a financial capital, and that the
designation of the place of payment as New York therefore "seem[ed] to be the
opposite of accidental."'I This test would also be met in the unlimited-liability
situation. To draw the-analogy, recall that the issue of unlimited liability would
arise only if a corporation committed a tort in the forum state. In those
circumstances, the business that the shareholder "guarantees," i.e., the business
of the corporation, would have a substantial connection with the forum state."12
108 989 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1993).
109 Id. at 82 (citing Savm v. Ramer, 898 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1990)). Savin involved a
simple note, not a guarantee. The court m Savn rejected jurisdiction on statutory grounds,
but went on to discuss the due process issues m dicta, indicating that a non-resident's
designation of a place of payment as "an unbargamed-for convenience" for the benefit of
the payee would not constitute the purposeful availment required by due process. Savmn, 898
F.2d at 307.
110 Sawzn, 898 F.2d at 307 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 299 (1980).
111 A.I. Trade Finance, 989 F.2d at 82-83. The court quoted the following comment
from the Supreme Court: "By issuing negotiable debt instruments denominated in U.S.
dollars and payable in New York and by appointing a financial agent in that city, [the
defendant] 'purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
[United States].'" ld. at 83 (quoting Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,
619-20 (1992) (citations omitted and "the defendant" interpolated by Second Circuit)). In
Weltover, Argentina, the defendant, was the prmary obligor, not a guarantor. Weltover,
504 U.S. at 609-10.
112 This conclusion is even more clear in some other cases that use the same basic
connection-with-the-forum-state approach, but also rely on a guarantor's economic interest
in the forum-state connection. See, e.g., National Can Corp. v. K Beverage Co., 674 F.2d
1134, 1138 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Signing a personal guaranty for a Kentucky business in which
one has an economic interest is the sort of 'conduct and connection with the form State' that
makes it reasonable to 'anticipate being haled into court there' when the underlying contract
is breached.") (citing World-Wde'Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297); Royal Bank of Canada v.
Trentham Corp., 491 F Supp. 404, 408 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (upholding constitutionality of
jurisdiction where "[i]t was in Defendant's business self-interests to establish [forum-state
corporation] as a potential customer for its engineering know-how" and "[t]o that end,
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The second approach to jurisdictional issues in the guaranty context rejects
the place of payment as the predicate for jurisdiction and looks to the broader
range of activities in which the nonresident guarantor engaged.' 13 These cases
typically find jurisdiction "so long as [the guarantor's] conduct is such that he
should foresee that his actions would have effects in [the forum] state." 114
Although such an "effects" test might seem to abandon the "purposeful
availment" aspect of the due process test, in fact the test, like the Second
Circuit's, is usually applied in such a way as to require some other economic
relationship with a forum state resident 115 In light of that requirement, the
Defendant agreed to guarantee loans made by Plaintiff to the [forum] corporation"), vacated
on other grounds, 665 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1981).
113 See, e.g., Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 503 (Fla. 1989)
("[W]e do not believe that the mere failure to pay money m Florida, standing alone, would
suffice to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.") (footnote and citation omitted);
Keelean v. Central Bank of the South, 544 So. 2d 153, 157 (Ala. 1989) ("Or does the mere
signing of a guaranty, out of state, for performance in state, present the sufficient contact
with the [forum state] necessary for in personan jurisdiction? .. In determining whether
the nonresident guarantors possessed sufficient contact with the [forum state] for a trial court
to obtain in personam junsdiction, it is necessary for us to examine all the relevant facts of
the case.") (citation omitted).
1 14 Millette v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 613 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Ala. 1992); see also
Keelean, 544 So. 2d at 157. The Alabama courts rely for this reading of the due process
requirements on Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Clder was a challenge by a writer
and editor for a Florida-based publication who wrote and edited an allegedly defamatory
article about a Califorma resident to jurisdiction in California. The Court held that because
the article "concerned the Califorma activities of a Califorma resident," "impugned the
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered m Califorma," "was
drawn from California sources," and caused the "brunt" of its harm in California, that
"Califorma [was] the focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Id. at 788-89
(footnote omitted). Hence, the Court said that "[j]unsdiction over petitioners [was] therefore
proper m California based on the 'effects' of their Florida conduct m Califorma." Id. at 789
(citing World-Wde Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297-98; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr
OFLAW § 37 (1969)).
115 See, e.g., Millette, 613 So. 2d at 1228 (forum state had jurisdiction over
nonresident owners of corporation who guaranteed corporate line of credit from corporation
whose headquarters and principal place of business was in forum state and guarantors
traveled to forum state to negotiate modification of credit agreement); Venetian Salami Co.,
554 So. 2d at 503 (affidavits alleging that nonresident contacted resident in forum state to
engage his services in investing delinquent debt, m part in forum state, and payment would
be made in forum state, sufficient to preclude summary judgment); Jones v. Directors Guild
of America, Inc., 584 So. 2d 1057, 1059-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (affidavit alleging
that nonresident was executive producer of motion picture and guaranteed payments to
directors hired by movie's production company sufficient to preclude summary judgment,
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distinctive feature of the "effects" test seems to be a requirement that the
guarantor know that the guarantee relates to business iu the forum state. As one
court said, "[i]t appears that the [guarantors] knew that they were guaranteeing
the debts of [a non-forum-state corporation] and knew that [the non-forum-state
corporation] was purchasing steel on credit from a corporation located in [the
forum state]." 116 Thus, under this rationale, jurisdiction could be found over a
shareholder of a non-forum-state corporation who knew that the corporation
was doing business, and thus could incur a tort judgment, in the forum state,
and also knew that the state's law imposed unlimited liability. The requirement
of such knowledge goes beyond a mere economic interest in the forum-state
activity, but is still likely to be met by shareholders, as will be shown
below. 117
b. Insurance
Insurance contracts present another important analogy to unlimited liability.
In one sense, insurance is not as good an analogy to shareholder liability as is
the guaranty relationship, because insurers are primarily, rather than
secondarily, liable, and because one aspect of an insurance contract is the duty
to defend. In another way, though, insurance is a better analogy, because a
liability insurer can be required to pay the amount of tort judgments, whereas
guaranties typically apply only to contractual arrangements. In any event, all
three relationships-shareholder liability, guaranties, and insurance-present an
issue of indirect liability of one party for an obligation of another, and it is that
issue on which the minimum-contacts question turns. 118
where there is factual question as to nonresident guarantor's connection with production
company and place where movie was being produced).
116 Millette, 613 So. 2d at 1228; see also Venetian Salam Co., 554 So. 2d at 501 ("It
is these factors-pnor negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the
terms of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing-that must be evaluated m
determining whether the defendant purposefully established nnmmum contacts within the
forum.") (quotiig Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985)).
117 See infra part IV.
118 It is important to note that the analogy being drawn in this section is one between
an unlimited-liability shareholder and an insurer. There is, therefore, no question of Seuler
jurisdiction, see Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966), in which a plaintiff seeks to
obtain jurisdiction over an absent defendant by attaching the defendant's insurer's obligation
to indemnify and defend. In other words, the argument is not that a plaintiff could get
jurisdiction over a shareholder through the shareholder's insurer; the argument is that the
shareholder is an insurer. See Robert B. Thompson, Unpaclang Lidted Liability: Direct
and Wcanous Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND.
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States generally require insurers to register and to appoint the state
insurance commissioner as their agent for service of process.119 Therefore,
jurisdictional issues usually do not play a large part in insurance litigation.
However, occasionally an insurer that is not registered in a state will sell
insurance contracts there, and may then refuse to appear if a claim is made. To
meet this difficulty, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners has
advanced the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act.120 The Act provides that any
"unauthorized foreign or alien insurer" will be deemed to have appointed the
state insurance commissioner its agent for service of process if it issues
insurance contracts "to residents of this state or to corporations authorized to
L.REv. 1, 21 (1994) ("One can view unlimited liability as a method by which shareholders
provide insurance to tort victims of the enterprise.").
This distinction is important because Professor Alexander says that "Professors
Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that the existence of insurance might provide a way to
avoid the jurisdictional problems associated with their proposal." Alexander, supra note 9,
at 404 (footnote omitted). She suggests that m making tns claim Hansmann and Kraakman
rely on Seider jurisdiction, which was rejected by the Supreme Court m Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980). Alexander, supra note 9, at 404-05. That is not Hansmann and
Kraakman's point, though. Hansmann and Kraakman say only that "insurance could greatly
facilitate collection against small shareholders . . by centralizing the collection effort
against a handful of insurers rather than numerous shareholders." Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 1, at 1901. In other words, their point is not related to jurisdiction, but simply to
the practicalities of litigation.
Hence, nothing m Rush presents a problem here. In Rush, a Minnesota resident sought
to obtain jurisdiction over the insurance policy of an Indiana resident with no contacts m
Minnesota by garnishing the obligation of the defendant's insurer, which did business in
Minnesota, to defend and indemnify. Rush, 444 U.S. at 322-25. The Court rejected the
attempt, concluding that "it cannot be said that the defendant engaged m any purposeful
activity related to the forum that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just, or
reasonable, merely because ins insurer does business there." Id. at 329 (citations omitted).
The analogy in the unlimited-liability context, in light of unlimited-liability shareholders'
role as insurers in the analogy, would be an attempt by a plaintiff injured by a corporate tort
to obtainjursdiction over the corporation in a state in which the corporation had no contacts
but one of its shareholders did. That is not the jurisdictional problem that unlimited liability
presents.
119 See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW §1212 (McKinney 1985).
12 0 UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS PRocEss Acr (National Association of Insurance
Commissioners 1991). The Act's purpose is "to subject certain insurers to the jurisdiction of
courts of tins state m suits by or on behalf of insureds or beneficiaries under insurance
contracts." l § 1.
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do business in the state." 121 This or similar legislation has been adopted by
forty-one states. 122
The Act's assertion of jurisdiction over an insurer who issues a contract to
a corporation doing business m the forum state, which is analogous to a similar
assertion over an unlimited-liability shareholder, has been upheld by the
courts. 123 In a recent Second Circuit case, Armada Supply Inc. v. Wnght,124
the insured was a Texas corporation that contracted with a Brazilian oil
company to purchase oil to be delivered in New York. The oil was insured by
the Brazilian company for its shipment from Rio de Janeiro to New York, and
during the trip it became contaminated. The district court awarded a judgment
to the Texas corporation against the Brazilian insurer, which then argued on
appeal that the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over it. The
court of appeals rejected the jurisdictional argument. It quoted New York's
version of the act and noted that the insurer had, at the request of the Brazilian
company, delivered a certificate of insurance to the Texas corporation in New
121 Id. § 2(A).
122 Id. at 850-5 to 850-8 (listing the states adopting such provisions). Although the
corporate aspect of the Act, the subject of the text discussion, has not been considered by
the Supreme Court, the Act more generally has twice come before the Court. In each case
the Court found jurisdiction, but m each the insurer's contacts with the forum state were
greater than those of a shareholder of a corporation doing business there. In McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the Court said that "[it is sufficient for
purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial
connection with that State." Id. at 223 (citations omitted). In McGee, however, the contract
had been delivered to the insured m California and the insured had mailed premiums from
there. Ld. at 221-22. Similarly, m Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950),
the Court found no jurisdictional problem in the state of Virginia's service of process on an
out-of-state insurer, citing its earlier recognition that "a state has a legitimate interest m all
insurance policies protecting its residents against risks." Id. at 647 (citing Osborn v. Ozlin,
310 U.S. 53, 62 (1940)). The insurer, however, had mailed applications to potential
insureds m Virginia, who then, if they chose, returned the applications and a fee to the
insurer m Nebraska. Id. at 645-46.
123 The provision has encountered jurisdictional difficulties only when the terms of the
statute were not met. See, e.g., Ford v. Unity Hosp., 299 N.E.2d 659 (N.Y. 1973); but see
Hilbun v. Califorma-Westem States Life Ins. Co., 210 So. 2d 307, 309-10 (Miss. 1968)
(rejecting jurisdiction over an insurer of an employer with employee in the forum state on
the ground that act providing for service of process on insurer stated that its concern was for
residents who "'hold policies of insurance issued or delivered them in tius state'" (quoting
Miss. CODE 1942 § 5705-11 (Supp. 1966) (emphasis added by court)). Although the failure
of the facts of a case to satisfy the terms of the statute obviates the need for a due process
mquiry, many courts nevertheless take a belt-and-suspenders approach.
124 858 F.2d 842 (2d-Cir. 1988).
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York. 125 This, the court said, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the
statute, in that the certificate "was issued directly to a company authorized to
do business in New York."1 26 The court did not consider the due process
question in any detail, but it did say that "no constitutional barriers existed to
the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over [the insurer] on these
facts."12 7
Significantly, Armada.Supply rejected the insurer's argument that it should
not be subject to jurisdiction in light.of Ringers' Dutchocs, Inc. v. S.S. S.L.
180.128 In Ringers' Dutchocs, the certificates of insurance, rather than being
delivered directly to a corporation authorized to do business in New York,
were issued to a German shipper made out to "the bearer," and the shipper
delivered the certificate to the plaintiff, which was the receiver of the shipped
good, in New York. 129 The Second Circuit made the following comments:
[W]e are of the view that although the insured "bearer" proved to be a
corporation authorized to do business m New York, that fact nevertheless was
not sufficient to confer jurisdiction pursuant to [the act] because it was by no
means certain, nor even likely, that the insured purchaser of the goods shipped
to a New York warehouse would m fact be a corporation authorized to do
business m New York. Thus, [the insurer's] conduct did not comport with the
conceptual underpinnings of long-arm jurisdiction-an implied consent to the
constructive agency through the voluntary and, therefore, knowing act of
msunng a corporation authorized to do business in New York. 13 0
This emphasis on the insurer's knowledge of the implications of its
assumption of liability in the forum state echoes the same concern in the
guarantor cases. 131 It is a requirement that would be met by shareholders in an
125 Id. at 848.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 849 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); McGee
v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950)). McGee and Travelers Health are discussed in note 122 supra.
128 494 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1974).
129 Id. at 679; see also Armada Supply, 858 F.2d at 848.
130 
'ngers'Dutchocs, Inc., 494 F.2d at 679.
131 See supra part llI.C.2.a. Other courts have also followed this basic knowledge-
based approach. For example, m a case in which an Indiana corporation insured several
corporations that were not New York corporations but had offices and employees m New
York, the Civil Court of the City of New York said that the defendant insurer was
"chargeable with knowledge that its corporate insureds intended to provide this coverage
under the group policies to New York residents and that the New York residents were the
covered beneficiaries of these contracts." Comprehensive Foot Care Group v. Lincoln Nat'l
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unlimited-liability regime, as is discussed in the next part of this article. It is
also a requirement that is entirely consistent with Supreme Court jurisdictional
decisions, as is discussed in the next section.
D. Liability, Purposeful Availment, and the Supreme Court
The two requirements for liability-based jurisdiction discussed in the last
section, economic benefit from the arrangement that creates the liability' 32 and
knowledge of the potential forum-related effects of that arrangement, 133 are
entirely consistent with Supreme Court precedent in this area, at least if both
are present. 134 Because the Court has not decided a case that presented a close
factual analogy to liability-based jurisdiction, it has not discussed the
jurisdictional issues in precisely these same terms. Nevertheless, in some of the
Court's decisions, 135 most particularly Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 136 the
circumstances are similar enough so that the Court does rely on some of the
same basic concepts. Burger King is mentioned only briefly by Professor
Alexander, who devotes most of her attention to two other cases, Shaffer v.
Life, 517 N.Y.S.2d 652, 655 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987). The court suggested that an insurer
would be subject to jurisdiction whenever it had issued policies to corporations that
themselves had nmmum contacts with the forum state. Id. Similarly, in a case arising
under a different statute, one that referred only to the "transacting of business" m the state,
a federal district court held that the issuance of a liability insurance policy to the owner of a
boat that, by the terms of the policy, was specified to be operating in Louisiana, was
sufficient to subject the insurer to jurisdiction in Louisiana. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v.
M/V John E. Coon, 207 F Supp. 45, 48 (E.D. La. 1962).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 113-17 and 123-31.
134It s not clear whether, as some of the lower court cases discussed m the last section
suggest, either alone is sufficient. However, because the first of the requirements, economic
benefit from the liability relationship, is always present in the shareholder context, it is
enough that the second requirement, knowledge of potential effects in the forum state, is
also factually present and that the two requirements together are legally sufficient. The
factual presence of the second requirement is discussed infra part IV.
135 Although this section concentrates on Burger King, the Court's cases considering
the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act also support the conclusion reached here. The
insurance cases are described briefly supra note 122.
136 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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Heitner3 7 and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,138 which present
much less close factual analogies. 139
In Burger King, as in the shareholder situation, the connection of the
defendant to the forum state was not strong, but was known and accepted. The
defendant, Rudzewicz, was a Burger King franchisee; Burger King was based
in Florida, where it brought suit, but Rudzewicz's dealings with the company
had been through its Michigan office. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had no
difficulty in deciding that Rudzewicz's contacts with Florida were sufficient to
support jurisdiction. It described his dealings with Burger King as a "voluntary
137 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
138 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
139 World-Wde Volkswagen is discussed m the text of this section, but Shaffer is not
sufficiently analogous to make extended discussion necessary. The case was based on a
"sequestration" procedure of Delaware law which allowed Delaware to obtain jurisdiction
over a suit by "sequestering" any of the defendant's property in the state. In Shaffer, the
plaintiff brought suit m Delaware against the officers and directors of a Delaware
corporation, and asserted jurisdiction based on the defendants' ownership of stock in the
corporation, relying on another Delaware law that made the state the situs of stock of a
corporation incorporated there. The Supreme Court pointed out that this sort of quas7 in rein
jurisdiction, though purportedly over property only, also governs the interests of persons in
the property. Shafer, 433 U.S. at 207 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLIcr OF
LAwS § 56, Introductory Note (1969)). The Court noted that there was only a coincidental
relationship between the grounds for liability and the presence of the defendants' property in
Delaware. Id. at 213-15. The court also pointed out that "as Heitner's failure to secure
jurisdiction over seven of the defendants named in his complaint demonstrates, there is no
necessary relationship between holding a position as a corporate fiduciary and owning stock
or other interests in the corporation." Id. at 214 (footnote omitted).
Professor Alexander observes that the Court in Shaffer "held that mere ownership of
shares does not satisfy the mimmum contacts test, even when the corporation is
incorporated in the state." Alexander, supra note 9, at 396 (footnote omitted). But "mere"
ownershp of shares is not at issue with unlimited liability, and the Court in Shaffer said that
the ownership of property could be relevant in determining whether jurisdiction was proper.
See .qffer, 433 U.S. at 207-08. Most relevant here, the Court said that "[t]he presence of
property may... favor jurisdiction in cases, such'as suits for injury suffered on the land of
an absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership of the property is conceded but the
cause of action is otherwise related to rights and duties growing out of that ownership." Id.
at 208 (footnote omitted). Obviously, shareholder liability is directly "related to rights and
duties growing out of the ownership" of shares. As Professors Hansmann and Kraakman
state, "Shaffer is fully consistent with basing jurisdiction on stock ownership when, as under
[their] proposed pro rata liability rule, stock ownership is the very predicate of substantive
tort liability, and the amount of stock owned determines the damages for which the
defendant is liable." Henry Hansmarn & Reiner Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on
Unlimited Shareholder Liability, 106 HARV. L. REv. 446, 457 (1992) (footnote omitted).
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acceptance of the long-term and exacting regulation of his business from
Burger King's Miami headquarters." 140 The Court's view of the arrangement
was not changed by the fact that Rudzewicz dealt almost exclusively with
Burger King's Michigan office, because, the Court said, "Rudzewicz most
certainly knew that he was affiliating himself with an enterprise based primarily
in Florida." 141 The Court hdd this view despite the fact that Rudzewicz's only
dealings with Florida were indirect. 142
A shareholder has a similar relationship with the citizens of a state in
which her corporation is doing business. If the shareholder is aware that a
corporation in which she owns stock is doing business in an unlimited liability
state, her purchase or continued ownership of the stock is, like Rudzewicz's
entry into his franchise agreement, a "voluntary acceptance" of her connection
with that state and its residents. Furthermore, the shareholder, like Rudzewicz,
benefits from her connection with the forum state. This sort of benefit was also
relied on by the Court in Burger King, which said that
where individuals 'purposefully derive benefit' from their interstate activities,
it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other States
for consequences that arise proximately from such activities; the Due Process
Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate
obligations that have been voluntarily assumed. 1 4 3
In place of Burger King, Professor Alexander relies on World-Wide
Volkswagen, an earlier case. She says that World-Wide Volkswagen "foreclosed
the argument that jurisdiction could constitutionally be based solely on the fact
that out-of-state shareholders derive economic benefit from the corporation's in-
state activities."'144 The use of the word "solely" perhaps makes this statement
technically true, but it is incomplete. It is true that the Court in World-Wide
Volkswagen said that "financial benefits accruing to the defendant from a
collateral relation to the forum State will not support jurisdiction if they do not
140 Burger'King, 471 U.S. at 480.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 481 (noting that when Rudzewicz had disagreements with Burger King,
he "learned that the Miclgan office was powerless to resolve their disputes and could only
channel their commumcations to Miami").
143 Id. at 473-74 (citation omitted). See also Leebron, supra note 1, at 1582-83
(observing that the torts of corporations can be viewed as "caused" by shareholders'
investments).
144 Alexander, supra note 9, at 396.
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stem from a constitutionally cognizable contact with that State." 145 However, it
also said that "[tihe forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due
Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers
its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers in the forum State." 146 The Court's reference to the
defendant's expectation is crucial. The defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen
were a New York automobile dealer and its regional distributor, which
operated only m New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The plaintiffs, who
had purchased an automobile from the defendant dealer and had been injured in
an automobile accident in Oklahoma, sought to obtain jurisdiction over the
dealer and distributor in Oklahoma. The Court specifically stated that there was
nothing in the record that showed even that the defendants there "indirectly,
through others, serve[d] or [sought] to serve the Oklahoma market." 147 The
Court clearly nplied that if they had, the outcome of the case would have been
different; that difference would have derived from the defendant's expectation.
The plaintiffs' argument in World-Wide Volkswagen was basically that their
use of the automobile in Oklahoma was foreseeable, an argument that the Court
rejected: "[Tjhe foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it
is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 148 The
Court's concern was that a defendant should not be required to appear in a
distant forum as a result of "the mere 'unilateral activity of those who claim
some relationship with a nonresident defendant.'' 149 In that respect, Burger
King and World-Wide Volkswagen are clearly different, 150 and shareholder
liability is much closer to Burger King. In Burger King, the defendant sought
out the connection with Florida by choosing to invest in a Burger King
franchise, regardless of the fact that he dealt only with Burger King's Michigan
office. Similarly, a corporate shareholder, by investing in a corporation,
establishes a connection-albeit an indirect one-with the states in which the
145 World-Wde Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (citing Kulko v. California Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94-95 (1978)).
146 Id. at 297-98 (emphasis added) (citing Gray v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (111. 1961).
147 Id. at 295.
14 8 Id. at 297 (citations omitted).
14 9 Ld. at 298 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
150 That is, they are factually different. The Court throughout Burger King cites
World-Wde Volkswagen, suggesting that it sees no legal inconsistency between the two
cases, and indeed there is none.
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corporation does business. Both of these circumstances are very different from
World-Wide Volkswagen, where the dealer and distributor established no
connection, even indirectly, with Oklahoma; the connection was established
purely by the automobile's purchaser. The crucial distinction is the defendant's
knowledge and voluntary acceptance of the forum-state connection, neither of
which was present in World-Wide Volkswagen but both of which were present
in Burger King and would be present for a corporate shareholder. 151
As the Court said in World-Wide Volkswagen, when the defendant
purposefully avails itself of a state's laws, "it has clear notice that it is subject
to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by
procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks
are too great, severing its connection with the State." 152 All of these
possibilities are available to corporate shareholders. If they are concerned about
the risk of unlimited liability, they could purchase portfolio insurance (a
possibility discussed by Hansmann and Kraakman 53), they could pass the cost
on to the "consumer"-actually the corporation-by paying a lower price for
the stock, or they could disinvest in the corporation. All that is necessary is that
the shareholder have knowledge of her potential limited liability, and, as
discussed in the next part of this article, she will.
IV. SHAREHOLDER ACCEPTANCE OF UNLIMITED LIABIMT
The cases discussed in the last section indicate the central question that
must be answered in determining whether a party, liable for a debt in a state, is
subject to jurisdiction there: did the party know of the forum-state connection
of its liability? In the unlimited-liability context, then, the question would be
whether shareholders purchased or held their shares with knowledge of their
151 Note that though the Court m World-Wide Volkswagen recognized that it was
foreseeable that an automobile sold by the defendant dealer would be driven to Oklahoma,
and determined that such foreseeability was not enough to establish jurisdiction, the Court
rejected the view that "foreseeability is wholly irrelevant." Id. at 297. Instead, it said that if
a defendant's m-state activity "is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the
efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its
product m other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States." Id.
(emphasis added).
152 Id at 297. The Court said that the jurisdictional requirements of the Due Process
Clause "allow[] potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minmum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." Id.
153 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1901.
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potential liability for corporate activities in the forum state. 154 That, in turn,
would require that shareholders actively consider information relating to their
liability exposure and that information regarding that exposure was readily
available to them. The sections below conclude that both of these requirements
would be met if unlimited liability were imposed.
A. Active or Passive Shareholders?
For shareholders' liability in a forum state to support jurisdiction over
them, the shareholders must have taken an active and informed role in deciding
to invest in a corporation doing business there. A shareholder's active role in
making that investment decision allows him to control where he is subject to
jurisdiction, and due process requires no more. 155 More particularly, due
process does not require that shareholders play an active role in controlling the
corporation itself. For that reason, Professor Alexaner's references to "passive
investor[s]," 156 "passive ownership of shares," 157 and "mere ownership of
shares," 158 are not decisive. It is true that shareholders, at least shareholders of
a public corporation, are passive as regards the management of the
corporation, 159 but the important question is whether they are passive as
regards the act that subjects them to liability, their decision to invest.160
Many shareholders, even under current limited-liability law, are "active"
investors in this sense. Rational shareholders base their investment decisions on
the probable returns of their various investment options, so they will consider
the potential for unlimited liability in deciding whether to purchase or hold a
154 I do not intend here to beg the question; I use the term "potential" to reflect the
fact that liability is not certain, rather than to refer to a certain obligation for a liability that
may or may not in fact occur.
155 See World-Wde Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (describing the test as whether
the defendant is able "to structure [its] primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render [it] liable to suit"). See also supra part lIM.C-D.
156 Alexander, supra note 9, at 398.
157 Id
158 Id at 396.
159 Professor Alexander says that the shareholder must have "control over the actions
of an rn-state actor (the corporation)." Id. at 401. As part lIM.C.2, supra, showed,
guarantors and insurers can be subject to jurisdiction m states where they have taken on
liability, despite their lack of control over any actors m those states.
160 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 455 ("Under unlimited liability,
small investors (indeed, all investors) who cannot control a corporation's affairs directly will
decline to invest m the stocks of companes that do not adequately compensate investors for
the liability risks that they impose.").
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stock. As Judge Easterbrook and Professor. Fischel, in their defense of limited
liability, say: "Of course, rational shareholders understand the risk that the
managers' acts will cause them loss. They do not meekly accept it. The price
they are willing to pay for shares will reflect the risk." 161 The alternative, that
"[finvestors buy stock in the market and may know little more than its
price," 162 is not plausible. Investors must know something other than price to
decide in which corporation to invest. After all, they do not choose a stock
merely because it is priced at, say, $50; they choose it because, based on some
other information, they expect its future price to be greater than $50. That
"other information" is the stock's likelihood of increasing in price or
decreasing in price, 163 which includes the likelihood that its price will decrease
below zero-i.e., that it would subject its shareholders to liability.
It is true, of course, that acquiring information about a corporation's
business activities is not costless. For that reason, it is likely to be more
efficient for large shareholders than for small ones. Some empirical evidence
bears this out. Professor Bernard Black provides a survey of the evidence
comparing corporate stock ownership patterns with various measures of
corporate performance. 164 The evidence indicates that corporate ownership by
large shareholders adds value to corporations, and that institutional ownership
may do so also, though there the evidence is less clear. 165 Professor Black
argues that some of the increased performance is due to the monitoring of
management by large shareholders, 166 though he acknowledges that it could
simply reflect the direct and indirect effects of better stock-selection by large
shareholders. 167 For present purposes, it does not matter, because either
explanation relies on well-informed decision-making on the part of the large
161 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 94.
162 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DAriEL R. FiSCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE o
CORPORATE LAW 15 (1991). In their recent book, Easterbrook and Fischel appear to have
shifted toward this view. In the book's limited-liability chapter, they delete the passage
quoted at note 161 supra. See EAsTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra, at 42.
163 It is possible that this "other information" could come in the form of a broker's
recommendation that a stock be purchased, m which case the investor herself might not
have specific expectations regarding the corporation's expected future prices.
164See Bernard S. Black, The Value of lnstitutional Investor Monitonng: The Empincal
Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 917-27 (1992).
165 Id. at 917.
166 See uI at 923-24, 927.
167 See uL at 922 (noting indirect signalling effects), 927 (noting possibility that
institutional investors might be good stock-pickers).
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shareholders. 168 It seems likely, therefore, that at least those shareholders
would be aware of their corporation's activities in an unlimited-liability state,
and that jurisidiction over them would be supportable.
Moreover, however active shareholders are in evaluating information about
their corporate investments in the current limited-liability regime, they would
certainly become more active under unlimited liability. Indeed, commentators
have argued for limited liability precisely because of a belief that under
unlimited liability shareholders would have to engage in close monitoring of
corporate activities. 169 This argument has generally been made under the
assumption of joint and several shareholder liability, but shareholder
monitoring would no doubt increase under a pro-rata system as well. 170
Shareholders' greater potential losses under any unlimited-liability system
would justify a greater investment on their part to prevent such losses.
Alternatively, shareholders under unlimited liability might alter their
investment patterns. For example, they might shift their investments from
individual stocks to mutual funds, in order to obtain the protection of the funds'
diversification. In that case, the mutual fund would be the investment decision-
maker, and because mutual funds, like other professional investors, take an
168 Moreover, the better-stock-selection explanation is not subject to a recent critique
of the claim that institutional investors will serve an important monitoring function. See Jill
E. Fisch, Relationslup Investing: Wdl It Happen? Will It Work?, 55 OHio ST. L.L 1009
(1994). Professor Fisch points out that the performance of an institutional investor is
sometimes judged not m absolute terms, but m comparison with other investors against
which it competes. Id. at 1019-22. When that is the case, and when investors competing
against each other all stand to suffer comparable losses from unlimited liability, a single
investor might not benefit from costly efforts to improve management performance and
prevent such losses. That is so because the loss-prevention efforts could also confer benefits
on the investor's competitors, which by investing in the same companies could free-ride on
those efforts without themselves incurring their cost. Id at 1022-25. In that case, the loss-
preventing investor's performance would suffer, not improve, in comparison with its
competitors. Id. But, as Professor Fisch observes, if an investor can appropriate private
gains from its efforts, it can benefit from those efforts in relative terms as well as absolute
ones. ld. at 1038-41. Thus, if an investor devotes its attention to selecting stocks, rather
than to improving the performance of the companies in which it is invested, it can attain an
advantage over its competitors (so long as those competitors were not able, or willing, to
simply mimic its investment decisions). In the unlimited-liability context, therefore, an
investor could benefit by selecting for low risk of unlimited shareholder liability.
16 9 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 94-95; Halpern, supra note 1, at
135-36.
170But see Coffey, supra note 8, at 79-81 (arguing that pro rata shareholder liability
would cause investors to reduce their holdings in individual corporations and therefore
lower the return on monitoring).
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active role in choosing their investments, 171 a court would probably find that
for them that jurisdictional requirement was met.
At bottom, of course, the nature of shareholder decision-making under
unlimited liability will not be clear unless and until unlimited liability is
imposed.1 72 One of the points of this article is that the imposition of unlimited
liability would change the corporate landscape significantly 173 It seems likely
both that shareholders would treat their corporate investments differently, and
that, as a result, courts would treat the corporation-shareholder relationship
differently. Regardless of the exact form that relationship took, though, it
seems likely that under unlimited liability corporate shareholders would be
"active" decision-makers.
B. Shareholder Knowledge of Potential Unlimited Liability
Moving on to the specifics of the shareholder's decision, jurisdiction over a
shareholder based on her unlimited liability would require that she know, and
accept, that she could be liable in the forum state. 174 Professors Hansmann and
Kraakman suggest a similar point m their response to Professor Alexander, 175
171 This statement applies primarily to mutual funds that attempt to maximize their
returns, rather than to those, like index funds, -that attempt to match the return of some
specified target.
172 Some evidence on this issue is available m the example of American Express,
which is described m the text accompanying notes 50-55 supra and notes 333-37 infra. One
would also think that the California experience with unlimited liability, see supra notes 24-
37, might provide an opportunity for empircal research on this question, despite the
changes in the financial markets since California adopted limited liability m 1931. However,
this opportunity apparently has not yet been taken. See BLUMBERG, supra note 1 § 2.01.1,
at 46 ("The most interesting questions with respect to this fascinating episode m American
corporate history are unanswered. ... The issue of shareholder liability in California
clearly poses a promising area for economic lstonans.").
173 Other changes in current law could also change that landscape, of course. Some
commentators have proposed other changes designed to promote more active monitoring
and decision-making by corporate shareholders, see, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents
Watclung Agents: The Prorrse of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 811
(1992), and to the extent that those changes succeeded, they would strengthen the
jurisdictional arguments made here.
174 C. supra text accompanying notes 34-37 (discussing Supreme Court's apparent
reliance in Thomas v. Mattlessen, 232 U.S. 221 (1914), on defendant shareholder's
knowledge of California's unlimited-liability law).
175 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 139, at 454-55. Professors Hansmann and
Kiaakman contrast the shareholder's decision under limited and unlimited liability by noting
that even under limited liability a shareholder stands to lose the" entirety of his investment as
the result of a suit against the corporation m any state in wich it does business:
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but they do not consider whether in fact a shareholder would possess the
required knowledge. As the following sections show, in most circumstances the
shareholder would, though in some circumstances the connection between the
corporation and the unlimited-liability state might be insufficiently significant to
give rise to such knowledge.
1. Knowledge of Corporate Activities in an Unlimited-Liability State
If a state enacted unlimited liability, it is likely that information that a
corporation was doing business in that state would be widely available. One
does not have to share in the fears of some limited-liability advocates that
unlimited liability would cause catastrophic market effects to believe that a
state's imposition of unlimited liability would be a newsworthy event. The
information would be widely distributed in the financial media, probably with
analysis that discussed specifically which corporations the change was most
likely to affect. Most shareholders, including at least professional investors,
would know which corporations had significant unlimited-liability exposure,
and where. 176 Such investors might even reduce their holdings after the
imposition of unlimited liability, which would clearly indicate awareness of the
change (as well as acceptance of its risk for remaining holdings).
To the extent that shareholders might otherwise remain unaware of the
imposition of unlimited liability in a particular state, or might be unaware of
their corporation's activities in that state, corporate disclosure could fill the
void. Securities regulations require corporations to disclose to their investors
information that would be material to the investor's investment decision, which
the Supreme Court has defined as information for which there is "'a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of
Our proposed rule of pro rata shareholder liability merely alters this donvention so that
shareholders, upon investing in a corporation, are put on notice that they risk
substantive liability not just up to the amount they invest, but rather, up to their pro rata
share of a! tort damages assessed against the corporation. Assuming that shareholders
receive adequate notice of the new rule, there seems no reason why courts should
not be able to assert jurisdiction sufficient to collect the full damages for which
shareholders are liable under the substantive law.
Id.
176 It is instructive in this context to compare unlimited liability with state anti-takeover
provisions. Changes in anti-takeover provisions, though they arguably have considerably
less likelihood of affecting stock prices, are widely publicized.
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information made available.'' 177 The risk that a corporation's activities could
subject its shareholders to unlimited liability would generally be known to the
corporation itself,178 so if that risk were material to its shareholders the
corporation would be required to disclose it to the shareholders. If such
disclosure were made, the shareholder should be charged with knowledge of
her risk of unlimited liability. If such disclosure were not made, either because
the risk was not material or because the corporation did not meet its disclosure
requirements, jurisdiction might indeed be unavailable over shareholders, as is
discussed in the next section.
2. Immaterial or Undisclosed Corporate Activities in
an Unlimited-Liability State
The significance to a corporation's overall financial results of its individual
business activities, and hence of the laws by which those activities are
governed, differs widely. Hence, if some state or states imposed unlimited
shareholder liability, the significance of that change would depend on the
nature and the extent of the corporation's activities in that state.179 For a
corporation, say a bank, that operated in only one state, the liability laws of
177 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Industries, Inc.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). The rules of the national stock exchanges
are similar. For example, the New York Stock Exchange imposes the following
requirement:
A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or
information which nught reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its
securities. ThIs is one of the most important and fundamental purposes of the listing
agreement which the company enters into with the Exchange.
N.Y. Stock Exchange Listed Company Manual 202.05, repnnted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 23,519, at 17,214 (Oct. 18, 1989); see also American Stock Exchange Company
Guide § 401(a) ("A listed company is required to make immediate public disclosure of all
material information concerning its affairs, except in unusual circumstances."), reprinted in
American Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) 10,121 (1992).
178 There might be rare exceptions, as when a corporation's activities in a limited-
liability state had unexpected effects in another, unlimited-liability state. C. infra text
accompanying notes 179-85. In that case, the corporation would have no disclosure
obligation, and the shareholder, if uninformed, would not be subject to junsdiction in the
unlimited-liability state.
179 This assumes that a corporation's activities in a state are governed by the
shareholder-liability laws of that state, an issue that will be taken up in part V, infra, of this
article.
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that state would be the only ones of significance to its shareholders, because
they would apply to the entirety of the corporation's business. If, however, that
same bank had a branch in another state, the laws of that state might also be
important to shareholders, though only if the amount of business done there
were significant relative to the bank's overall business. If the corporation were
not a bank but a manufacturing company, and the company sold its products
nationwide, the liability rules of all the states might be of concern to
shareholders, depending on the potential liabilities presented by the company's
products. In sum, one can imagine a variety of arrangements of corporate
activities, and for each the liability implications for corporate shareholders
would be different.
These considerations, of course, apply under limited liability as well as
under unlimited liability: a shareholder's losses always depend on the liability
rules of the states in which its corporation does business. This fact is brought
out quite clearly in one of the Supreme Court's jurisdictional cases, Keeton v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc. 1so Keeton was a libel action brought against a magazine
publisher in New Hampshire, the only state in which the statute of limitations
for the action had not run. The publisher objected both to the assertion of
jurisdiction over it in New Hampshire, where only a small fraction of its
magazines were sold, and to being held liable there for damages relating to its
sales nationwide under the "single publication rule" for libel damages, 181 given
that the action could not have been brought in any other state. The Court found
the publisher's jurisdictional contacts with New Hampshire sufficient and
rejected both its statute-of-limitations and damages arguments. 182 By doing so,
the Court subjected the publisher's shareholder to losses based on the
peculiarities of New Hampshire law183 in the same way that shareholders of a
18o 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
181 The Court m Keeton quoted the following definition of the "single publication
rule"-
"As to any single publication, (a) only one action for damages can be maintained;
(b) all damages suffered m alljurisdictions can be recovered in the one action; and (c) a
judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for damages bars any
other action for damages between the same parties m alljunsdictions."
Ia at 773 n.2 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF TORTS § 577A(4) (1977)).182 Id. at 773-81.
183 See uI. at 779 ("IThe plaintiff's] successful search for a State with a lengthy statute
of limitations is no different from the litigation strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a
forum with favorable substantive or procedural rules or sympathetic local populations."); zd.
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corporation doing business in an unlimited-liability state would be subject to
losses based on the laws of that state. That a shareholder's losses under
unlimited liability could exceed her original investment, while her losses under
limited liability are limited to the total investment, would not alter this
principle. 184
The preceding paragraphs provide some context for the claim that
corporations would be required to disclose to their shareholders the risk of
unlimited liability if that risk were material. If the nature and extent of the
corporation's activities in unlimited-liability states were significant, the
corporation would be required to disclose information about those activities and
their implications. Shareholders' decisions to purchase or hold shares in the
corporation would then be made in light of information about their liability
risks, and their knowledge and acceptance of their liability would be sufficient
to subject them to jurisdiction to enforce it. Two questions then arise: would
shareholders be subject to jurisdiction in a state in which the risk of unlimited
liability was not material, and would they be subject to jurisdiction in a state
where the risk was material but was not disclosed to them by the corporation?
If the risk of unlimited liability were immaterial, and the shareholder
therefore were not informed of it,185 jurisdiction over the shareholder should
be unavailable, at least on the basis of her share ownership. Some shareholders
would still be reachable, of course-shareholders that had other muumum
contacts with the unlimited-liability state could be sued there, and shareholders
could be sued in other states in which they had minimum contacts-but there
probably would not be a forum in which an action could be brought against all
the shareholders. It should be noted, though, that this is perhaps more a
theoretical question than a real one. If a corporation's liability were in fact to
exceed its assets, so that an action was brought against its shareholders for their
unlimited liability, a claim by the corporation that it did not disclose the risk of
finding itself in that situation because that risk was immaterial might not
receive a sympathetic hearing.
This, then, raises the second question: What should be the result if a risk is
material but is not disclosed to shareholders? I believe that in that case, also,
at 781 ("[Slince [the publisher] can be charged with knowledge of the 'single publication
rule,' it must anticipate that such a suit will seek nationwide damages.").
184 That Is, it would not alter the nature of the shareholder's losses, though it might
alter their extent. For example, if a shareholder has invested $10,000 in a corporation, and
the corporation incurs considerable losses, of which her pro rata share is $10,200, unlimited
liability would increase her actual losses by only $200/$10,000, or 2%.
185 It mght still be possible to obtain jurisdiction over the shareholder if she had actual
knowledge of the liability risk in the state, but proof of such knowledge would be available
in only limited circumstances.
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jurisdiction over the shareholders would be inappropriate, because the
shareholders would not knowingly have accepted the risk of liability This need
not, however, as one might fear, create an incentive for corporate management
to free shareholders from their liability by not disclosing it. Some shareholders
would still be subject to jurisdiction in the unlimited-liability state, due to
minimum contacts established with that state through other means. Those
shareholders, because they would be caught unaware by their unlimited-liability
obligation as a result of the management's failure to disclose material
information, would have an action against the management for their losses,
based on that failure to disclose. Moreover, because shareholders in this
situation 186 would typically be large ones, with multi-state contacts, they would
probably have both the resources and the incentive to bring such an action. The
possibility of such actions should serve as the necessary incentive for
management to disclose corporate activities that could lead to unlimited
liability.
V. INTER-JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES
Choice of law may present a more serious obstacle to the imposition of
unlimited shareholder liability than do jurisdictional concerns. That is
especially so in that the jurisdictional rationale discussed above relies on
substantive liability, which in turn depends on the choice of substantive law.187
Nevertheless, it appears that, domestically at least, the shareholder liability law
of the state in which a corporation does business should prevail over the
corporation's state of incorporation, though perhaps only for certain
corporations. This conclusion is reached m the first two sections below under
both Commerce Clause and traditional choice-of-law analyses. Internationally,
however, the issue is a more difficult one; as the third section below points out,
other countries might refuse to enforce a U.S. unlimited-liability judgment.
186 Note that although only certain shareholders-those who were subject to
jurisdiction in the unlimited-liability state-could bring such an action, because only those
shareholders would have suffered a loss, this rule would not impose inconsistent
requirements on corporate officers and directors. Management's disclosure obligation would
extend to all shareholders; it is simply that only those shareholders who suffered a loss
would be entitled to a financial recovery, just as in a typical derivative disclosure action
only those who purchased shares at a price affected by inadequate disclosure can recover.
Moreover, other shareholders might be treated as having suffered a loss as well, because in
the future they could be subject to suit in the unlimited-liability state if they established
minimum contacts with that state.
187 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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A. Dormant Commerce Clause
A state's imposition of unlimited shareholder liability, like many other state
laws, would affect out-of-state corporations and shareholders, but it does not
appear that it would violate the dormant Commerce Clause. In fact, unlimited
liability seems more likely to redress current Commerce Clause difficulties
produced by limited shareholder liability than to introduce new ones. The
current state of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the corporate-law
context is set out in the Supreme Court's opinion in CMS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America.188 Although the Court's jurisprudence in this area has, as it
acknowledged m CS, "not always been easy to follow," 189 it appears to have
two strands. A state law may neither discriminate against out-of-state entities
nor subject such entities to a burden of inconsistent state regulations. 190
1. Discriminatory Law
If an unlimited liability law applied to any corporation doing business in a
state, the law would, in the words of C7, "'visit[ its effects equally upon both
interstate and local business.'"' 191 CT rejected a Commerce Clause challenge
to an antitakeover provision of Indiana's corporation law that stripped the
voting rights from shares of an Indiana corporation acquired by an investor
when the investor's ownership share exceeded a certain threshold. 192 The
investor could restore the voting rights to her shares only on a majority vote of
"disinterested" shareholders. 193 Although the Indiana law imposed burdens on
188 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
189 ld. at 87.
190 See d. at 88 ("This Court's recent Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated
statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent
regulations.") (citations omitted); Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State And-
Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Comerce Clause, and Insider Tratng, 1987 SuP.
Cr. REy. 47, 88 ("This 'inconsistent regulations' test appears to be distinct from the
discrimination test.").
191 CIS, 481 U.S. at 87 (quoting Lewis v. BT Inv. Mgrs., Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36
(1980)).
192 Id. at 72-73. The law apparently applied to three different thresholds, 20%, 33-
1/3%, and 50%, but the Court's opinon does-not explain when the different thresholds
applied. See zi at 73.
193 Id. at 73-74. As the Court stated, "'[ilnterested shares' are shares with respect to
which the acquiror [i.e., the investor who had acquired shares exceeding the statutory
threshold], and officer, or an insider director of the corporation 'may exercise or direct the
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the acquisition of Indiana corporations that did not apply to corporations in
other states, the Court did not believe that that was the relevant inquiry.
Instead, the key point was that the Indiana law applied equally to in-state and
out-of-state investors: "Because nothing in the Indiana Act imposes a greater
burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on similarly situated Indiana
offerors, we reject the contention that the Act discriminates against interstate
commerce."
194
A single state's unlimited-liability law would operate similarly. Although it
would impose burdens on the shareholders of corporations that operated in
Indiana that would be greater than those in other states, the burdens would be
the same for in-state corporations (and shareholders) as they would be for out-
of-state corporations (and shareholders). In fact, because it is likely that
corporations incorporated in a particular state do a larger proportion of their
business m that state than do out-of-state corporations, it seems likely that the
burden of an unlimited liability law would fall most heavily on in-state
corporations. 195
Moreover, in considering whether an unlimited-liability law is
discriminatory, it must be remembered that the Commerce Clause issue arises
only when a loss is imposed on in-state persons by out-of-state corporations
(and, presumably, out-of-state shareholders). In such circumstances, it could
reasonably be said that it is the limited-liability law of the state of incorporation
that is discriminatory, because it allows shareholders of corporations chartered
there to avoid tort judgments in other states. Under this view, an unlimited-
liability law would not discriminate against out-of-state corporations or
shareholders, but would merely correct the discrimination that would otherwise
be imposed by other states' limited-liability laws. This idea-that a rule that the
law of the state of incorporation governs is itself problematic under the
dormant Commerce Clause-has previously been advanced by Professor
Fischel. 196 He discusses it in the context of the market for corporate control,
exercise of the voting power of the corporation in the election of directors.'" l at 73 n.2
(quoting IND. CODE § 23-1-42-3 (Supp. 1986)).
194 Id. at 88.
195 1 believe that, as I argue infra part V.B, a state's unlimited-liability law would
apply only to corporations' activities in that state. If, instead, a state's unlimited-liability law
applied to all corporations incorporated m that state, the statement in the text would be even
more clearly true (since "in-state corporations" means corporations incorporated in the
state).
196 Professor Fischel makes the following comments:
Corporate law has long been based on the principle that a corporation is governed
by the law of its state of incorporation. Corporations of any size, such as publicly held
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
where he believes that a discriminatory approach cannot endure, because
shareholders will pay less for the shares of corporations incorporated m states
that discriminate against them. 197 However, as Hansmann and Kraakman point
out, shareholders would have no reason to seek to avoid a law that imposes
costs not on them, but on tort victims in other states, so limited-liability laws,
unlike antitakeover provisions, present a very real danger of a "race-to-the-
bottom" effect. 198
2. Inconsistent Regulation
An unlimited liability law would also not subject either corporations or
investors to inconsistent regulations, or in any event would not do so any more
than other state economic regulations. The Court in CTM did not appear to
consider inconsistent regulation a serious problem in the tort context that would
apply to unlimited liability: "Firms that engage in interstate commerce are
subjected to differing state regulations routinely. Firms that sell products in
several states, for example, are subject to different tort rules in each state.
Some states have a negligence rule, other have strict liability; some have liberal
rules concerning the awarding of punitive damages, others do not." 199
Nevertheless, this issue is raised by Professor Alexander. The example that she
gives is that of a state that would seek to impose unlimited liability through a
firms, have investors throughout the country. Thus it is routine for the law of a state
where a corporation is incorporated to govern transactions between investors in other
states.
At first blush, this system of corporate governance where the laws of individual
states regulate transactions between individuals in other states might itself seem suspect
under the dormant Commerce Clause.
Fischel, supra note 190, at 84.
197 Id. at 67-70.
198 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1921-22. A related point was made
by Joncas v. Krueger, 213 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1973). Joncas considered the applicability to
foreign corporations of a Wisconsin statute making shareholders pro rata liable for unpaid
debts to employees for up to six months services. The court said that to exclude foreign
corporations from application of the law would raise a question of the denial of equal
protection to the employees of those foreign corporations, and the court said that it could
"see no valid distinction why shareholders of foreign corporations should be favored or why
Wisconsin employees working m Wisconsin should be classified for benefits depending
upon where their employer is incorporated." Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
199 Fischel, supra note 190, at 89.
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"doing business" statute that would require an out-of-state corporation doing
business m the state to adopt a charter provision making shareholders liable for
tort claims against the corporation. 2°° Professor Alexander says that a conflict
could arise if the corporation statute of another state, say Delaware, forbade
unlimited liability. In that case, she says, "Delaware corporations would be
unable to comply with both the law of the state of incorporation, which forbids
unlimited liability, and the law of the state in which they do business, which
requires unlimited liability." 20 This may not really be a concern, for two
reasons.
First, the imposition of unlimited liability would not require a doing-
business statute like the one Professor Alexander describes. As discussed
previously,2°2 shareholders of a corporation could have jurisdictionally-
adequate notice of the corporation's business activities in an unlimited-liability
state without any such statute.203 In the absence of such a statute, the suggested
conflict would arise only if a state-perhaps seeking to attract
incorporations204-were to enact a law stating that corporations incorporated
there were not subject to unlimited liability regardless of the liability laws of
the states in which they did business.205 It is no doubt theoretically possible
that a state could enact such a law. However, such a statute would be no more
likely to be upheld than a state statute that stated that the state's corporations
were not subject to the mcome tax laws of other states.2°6
Second, as a legal matter, Professor Alexander's concern appears to be just
another way of stating the choice-of-law problem. In CS, the Supreme Court's
discussion of the inconsistent-regulation issue relied on a conception very
similar to the corporate internal-affairs doctrine that is central to the choice of
200 Alexander, supra note 9, at 409-10.
201 Alexander, supra note 9, at 410. Professor Alexander says that CTS suggests that it
would be the doing-business statute that would have to give way. Id. As the text shows, that
is by no means clear.202 See supra parts III & IV.
203 Professor Alexander discusses the doing-business statute in the context of imposing
jurisdiction over shareholders on the basis of their notice of possible unlimited liability. See
Alexander, supra note 9, at 408-10.
204 See supra text accompanying note 199.
205 The reference here is to a law that would go firther than current corporate statutes,
whose limits on shareholder liability could be said to include such a provision implicitly,
and would attempt to decide the choice-of-law issues by explicitly stating that other states'
unlimited-liability laws would not be applicable.
206CY. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994)
(upholding Califorma's combined reporting requirement for corporate franchise tax, despite
the possibility that corporations could be exposed to multiple taxation).
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law for corporate issues. 207 The potential for inconsistent regulation to which
the Court referred involved issues of corporate governance that were, in
choice-of-law terms, corporate internal affairs. 208 However, the Court in CT
did not view differing state regulations of corporate relationships with outside
third parties as a Commerce Clause problem, as the passage .quoted above
demonstrates. 209 Resolution of this issue thus requires a determination of
whether shareholder liability is an internal or external matter, and that
determination, as the next section shows, is a novel and difficult one.
B. Choice of Law
The central question in choosing the appropriate law to govern a
corporation asks whether the particular issue involved is an internal one or one
that involves third parties. This question is one that has not yet been answered
in the context of' shareholder liability;210 furthermore, shareholder liability
would be a change in the corporate structure so significant that it is difficult to
extrapolate from current choice-of-law rules to resolve the question. I believe
that the answer one reaches turns on whether one views the issue of
shareholder liability for corporate torts as one of corporate law or of tort
law.211 Although neither view is clearly correct, I suggest below that their
relative attractiveness depends on the type of corporation and tort at issue.
1. Corporate Internal Affairs
As described earlier,212 the Supreme Court, when faced with the choice-of-
law issue in considering Califorma's unlimited-liability law in 1914, came
down firmly on the side of applying the law of California. In that case, though,
20 7 See infra part V.B. 1.
208 See CMI, 481 U.S. at 89 ("So long as each State regulates voting rights only m the
corporations it has created, each corporation will be subject to the law of only one State.").
209 See supra text accompanying note 199.
210 That is, it has not been answered in the context of general shareholder liability for
debts incurred in the normal operation of a corporation; as is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 215-17, the issue of shareholder assessments for capital deficiencies m
the formation of a corporation is determined by the law of the state of incorporation.
211 Professors Hansmann and Kraakman argue that shareholder liability is a question
of tort, not corporate, law. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1916-19. They make
this argument, however, with little discussion of the implications of factual distinctions
among cases, which I believe are critical. See mnfra part V.B.2.
2 12 See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
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the Court was faced with a case involving a corporation that was apparently
created specifically to do business in California.213 The question of the
appropriate choice of law on this issue more generally has apparently not yet
been faced by the courts. Not surprisingly, then, the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws is not very enlightening on the issue. The issue of shareholder
liability falls directly in a gap between two sections of the Restatement.
Section 301 states that "[tihe rights and liabilities of a corporation with
respect to a third person that arise from a corporate act of a sort that can
likewise be done by an individual are determined by the same choice-of-law
principles as are applicable to non-corporate parties." 214 This rule, though
sensible, is not very helpful; that the liability of the corporation should be
governed by the local rule.does not require that the same be true for the
liability of a shareholder. Section 307, which is entitled "Shareholders'
Liability," provides that "[t]he local law of the state of incorporation will be
applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability to the
corporation for assessments or contributions and to its creditors for corporate
debts." 215 Although this section appears at first glance to be helpful, and is
treated as dispositive by Professor Alexander, 216 the comments to section 307
make clear that it applies only to the situation in which "liability is imposed
upon the shareholders for such debts as the corporation incurs while engaging
in business before its capital stock (or a portion of its capital stock) has been
paid in."2 17 Neither section, then, decides which law should govern the
liability to a third party of a shareholder of a corporation following the
corporation's initial capitalization.
An attempt to address the gap between sections 301 and 307 is made in
section 302, which says that, for issues that are not covered by section 301,
[t]he local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine
such issues, except in the unusual case where, with respect to the particular
issue, some other state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied. 218
213 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
2 14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OFLAws § 301 (1969).
25 Id. § 307.
216 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 410 & n.119.
217 RESTATEMET (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § .307 cmt. a (1969). Comment a
also observes that "only shareholders who have not fully paid for their shares or who have
paid otherwise than m cash may be made liable to creditors of the corporation for its debts."
Id. 218Id. § 302.
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This rule, of course, only redirects the question to which state has the most
significant relationship to the problem. On this, the Restatement says that
[a]mong the factors that bear upon the question are (1) the nature and
extent of the corporation's relationship to the state of incorporation, (2) the
nature and extent of the ciirporation's relationship to the state whose local law
is sought to be applied and (3) whether the act is of the sort discussed in
Comment e-namely, one which cannot practicably be governed by the local
law of more than one state.2 19
The third of these factors, whether the particular issue can be governed by
the local law of more than one state, basically restates the inconsistent-
regulation aspect of the Commerce Clause inquiry, 220 which, as described
above,221 does not present a problem for shareholder liability. That leaves the
219 Id. § 302 cmt. g. The Restatement also says, similarly, that "[tlhe purpose sought
to be achieved by the relevant rules of the potentially interested states, and the relation of
these states to the transaction and the parties, are factors to be considered m determining the
state of most significant relationsinp." Id. § 302 cmt. c.
220 This conclusion is supported by comment e of § 302, to which the quoted passage
from comment g refers. Comment e makes the following comments:
In addition, many matters involving a corporation cannot practicably be
determined differently m different states. Examples of such matters, most of which have
already been mentioned in Comment a, include steps taken in the course of the original
incorporation, the election or appointment of directors and officers, the adoption of by-
laws, the issuance of corporate shares (see Comment 1), the holding of directors' and
shareholders' meetings, methods of voting including any requirement for cumulative
voting, the declaration and payment of dividends and other distributions, charter
amendments, mergers, consolidations, and reorganizations, the reclassification of
shares and the purchase and redemption by the corporation of outstanding shares of its
own stock.
Id. § 302 cmt. e. All of these questions are corporate internal affairs, unlike the
commission of a corporate tort against a third party. Comment e makes this explicit m the
following comments, which immediately follow the paragraph quoted above:
Matters such as these must be contrasted with the acts dealt with in § 301, which
include, for example, the making of contracts, the commission of torts and the transfer
of property. There is no reason why corporate acts of the latter sort should not be
governed by the local law of different states.
AL
221 See supra part V.A.2.
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first two factors, which in this context are difficult to reconcile. The first refers
to contacts with the state of incorporation, which are based on the corporate
law of that state, and the second refers to contacts with the state in which the
tort was committed, which are based on that state's tort law. The choice-of-law
question thus requires a choice between tort law and corporate law.
2. Tort Law or Corporate Law?
It is not surprising that, at bottom, one's view of the proper choice of law
for shareholder liability depends on one's views of the proper function and
scope of tort law and corporate law. In some respects, this issue again presents
the alternative views that appeared in the jurisdictional inquiry. From the
corporate-law perspective of Professor Alexander, 222 shareholders are passive
participants in the corporate enterprise who should not be held responsible for
any acts of the corporation. From the tort-law perspective of Professors
Hansmann and Kraakman, 223 shareholders' investments, and their ability to
decide where to place those investments, make shareholders efficient cost-
avoiders and cost-bearers. Neither of these perspectives is without its problems.
On the one hand, the view that shareholders are passive investors that do
not, and should not, have to take into account the potential losses of unlimited
liability begs the question. As discussed earlier,22 4 if shareholder liability were
made unlimited, it is unlikely that shareholders would remain as passive as they
now are. Even m the current limited-liability regime, many investors,
particularly professional investors, are quite aware of the specific activities in
which their corporations engage, so that their investments are in effect votes
approving of those activities. That shareholders are active investment decision-
makers does not, of course, say that there are not substantive justifications for
limited liability; it does, however, say that it is not enough simply to claim that
shareholders are purely passive victims of corporate tort liability.
On the other hand, the view of Professors Hansmann and Kraakman that
"shareholder liability for corporate torts should be viewed as a question of tort
law rather than corporate law"22-5 is not self-evident, either. Their claim that
222 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 398.
223 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1916-19.
224 See supra part V.A.
22 5 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1921. Professors Hansmann and
Kraakman do not make this point in the jurisdictional context. Instead, they make it in
arguing that it is principles of tort law, not corporate law, that should determine the
appropriate limits to an unlimited liability regime and that should inform choice-of-law
decisions. Thew jurisdictional comments are made in passing in the choice-of-law
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"[s]tate corporation statutes are commonly silent, or at least ambiguous, as to
whether shareholders have limited liability for corporate torts," relying on a
strained reading of the Delaware corporation statute,226 is not convincing. They
also argue that applying the corporate law of the state of incorporation is
inappropriate because, as noted above,227 competition among states for a
shareholder-value-maximizing rule would lead to more limited liability. 228 That
is, given the nature of limited liability, corporate liability laws will be enacted
in a "race for the bottom," so that looking to the law of the state of
incorporation would itself be a substantive choice of limited liability. That
seems clearly true, but it indicates only that one cannot rely on state corporate-
law competition to produce desirable corporate law, not that current corporate
law is necessarily inappropriate.
Hansmann and Kraakman temper their preference for tort law over
corporate law by suggesting that the application of unlimited liability in tort
should vary with the structure of the corporation at issue.229 They suggest that
the justifications for imposing unlimited liability are strongest for corporations
that are wholly-owned subsidiaries of other corporations, and that the
justifications become less strong for publicly-held corporations and even less
strong for corporations that are closely-held by individuals. 230 In making this
suggestion, though, Hansmann and Kraakman do not deviate from their view
that the liability decision should be made purely on the basis of tort law,
because their reasoning rests on whether the resulting liability would serve the
risk-avoidance and risk-bearing purposes of tort law. They observe, for
example, that because individual owners of a closely-held corporation are not
easily able to diversify their risk, they are poor bearers of the risk of tortliability.23 1
These considerations of tort law are important and should certainly be
considered. However, corporate-law goals are also important, so it seems better
not to confine the inquiry solely to tort law but to resolve these questions in the
discussion. See u. at 1922. Those comments are admittedly cursory-m fact, just two
sentences-because the jurisdictional question is peripheral to their overall inquiry-whether
unlimited shareholder liability is desirable, not whether it is feasible. It is largely these two
sentences with which Professor Alexander's article takes issue.
226 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1921 & n.108 (citing DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(6)). For a convincing refutation of this claim, see Alexander, supra note 9,
at 414-15.
227 See supra text accompanying note 198.
228 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1921-22.
229 Id. at 1917-18.
230 Id.
231 Id. at- 1917.
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context of a choice-of-law inquiry considering both bodies of law. In fact,
corporate-law considerations sometimes support and sometimes oppose tort-law
considerations. For example, the corporate-law goal of promoting the most
efficient monitoring of corporate management has much m common with the
tort-law goal of providing efficient risk-avoidance.2 32 From both perspectives,
it is sensible to impose full tort liability on corporate shareholders when
shareholders are also management, as in parent-subsidiary relationships and m
closely-held corporations. 233 On the other hand, it can be argued that one of
the goals of corporate law, and more particularly of limited liability, is to
encourage the pursuit of risky business opportunities, and that goal is in direct
conflict with the risk-avoidance goal of tort law.234 In this respect, the goals of
232 The parallel is most close when tort damages are felt fully by shareholders, i.e.,
when shareholder liability is unlimited.
233 The latter conclusion, that it is effective from a tort nsk-avoidance perspective to
impose unlimited shareholder liability on closely-held corporations, is in conflict with the
conclusion of Professors Hansmann and Kraakman that imposing unlimited liability on such
corporations could be undesirable. The conflict results from the focus of Hansmann and
Kraakman on risk-beanng-from which they conclude that the shareholders of close
corporations would find it difficult to diversify-and their neglect of nsk-avoidance
considerations. . Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1917-18.
234 A recent article argues for the application of limited liability to close corporations
for other reasons. See Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of
Resources, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 140 (1994). Professor Booth's arguments are both
descriptive and prescriptive. Descriptively, he says (by example) that even under limited
liability shareholders are usually personally liable for corporate debts. In contract, this is
true because creditors of a close corporation generally require shareholders to personally
guarantee the corporation's debts. Id. at 154-55; see also supra note 105. In tort, Professor
Booth argues that shareholders are often liable because they will themselves have committed
the tort. Booth, supra, at 155-56. As Professor Booth recogmzes, this probably goes too
far, m that it would not apply to small corporations that have non-shareholder employees.
ld. at 155. Professor Booth also argues, though, that because close corporations'
shareholders often will not be diversified, they will be good monitors of their employees. Id.
at 156-57. That may be true, but it is still the case that freeing shareholders of some of their
liability will also free them of some of their incentive to monitor, a point that Professor
Booth argues elsewhere supports unlimited liability. See id. at 147 ("Reduced to their
essence, these arguments [that unlimited liability would require expensive monitoring] say
that because the true cost of investing will sometimes exceed the benefit, some of the cost
should be borne by others.").
Prescriptively, Professor Booth concentrates almost exclusively on contract creditors,
arguing that it is more efficient to place the burden of negotiating the terms of liability on
creditors, as happens under limited liability, than on shareholders, as it would be under
unlimited liability. Id. at 157-58. As to involuntary tort creditors, he would rely solely on
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tort and corporate law may be irreconcilable, and it may truly be necessary to
choose between them.
The choice between tort and corporate law should be made by considering
the implications of both bodies of law for the facts of the particular case.
Weighing the goals of both in light of the nature of the corporate activity at
issue, one would find that unlimited shareholder liability would not always
serve either the deterrence goal of tort law or the corporate-law goal of
promoting risky economic activity. For example, if the chances of a particular
corporate tort occurring were very low, but the injury that resulted from it was
very high, it might not be effective to place the loss on the corporation's
shareholders, especially if the corporation was a closely-held one; to do so
might greatly discourage corporate activities of that kind, while perhaps
providing little in the way of either deterrence or compensation 23 5 for the tort
victim. Conversely, if a particular corporate activity had a low chance of
providing shareholders with a very high return, but a high chance of imposing
risks on third parties, there seems no reason why shareholders should not be
liable; to hold otherwise would be to encourage them to play the lottery at
others' expense.
3. An Analogy: Corporate Liability After Dissolution
Before leaving this topic, it is worth pointing out an important analogy to
unlimited shareholder liability: corporate liability after dissolution. 23 6 From a
choice-of-law perspective, whether a dissolved corporation's susceptibility to
suit is governed by the laws of its state of incorporation or by those of the state
where suit is brought presents much the same problem as unlimited liability. In
each case, the answer requires a choice between the law applicable to the
corporation's relationship with a third party and the law applicable to its own
internal affairs. Moreover, in each case the fundamental effect of the result will
be to determine the return to shareholders.
Although the states are not unanimous on this question, there appears to be
a trend toward applying the law of the state in which the cause of action arose.
piercing the veil, id. at 164-65, and then apparently "only when the corporate form is used
to perpretrate fraud or intentional harm," id. at 143. In my view, that reflects an election of
corporate-law principles at the expense of tort-law ones, when both should be considered.
235 The ftilure of unlimited liability to provide compensation would be largely
dependent on the wealth of shareholders, but if the damages caused by a tort were very
hlgh, compensation would be less adequate.
236 1 am indebted to Steve Bahls for pointing out this analogy to me.
[Vol. 56:815
UNLIMITED LIABILITY
At least one state, Montana, has recently established this rule by statute. 237
According to the chair of the committee that drafted the Montana statute, the
committee relied on the analysis of the issue in a California case, North
American Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court,238 m choosing its rule.239 North
American Asbestos emphasized the fact that the state of incorporation has no
necessary relation to the business of the corporation:
[W]hen we are considering a large national corporation doing business
throughout the United States the singular interest of the state of incorporation is
diminished. Being the state of incorporation does not establish it as the state in
which the corporation conducts most of its business or has a majority of its
shareholders. A state of incorporation is often selected on a basis of certain tax
advantages or a liberal securities act.240
The court emphasized, in contrast, that California's relationship with an
out-of-state corporation's activities can be more real, noting that "[w]hen a
person suffers injury m California as a result of business conducted by a
foreign corporation then qualified to do business within the state, California has
a legitimate interest that the foreign corporation not be permitted to avoid
responsibility for its wrongful act by withdrawing from the state." 241 Hence,
because in North American Asbestos "the conduct giving rise to the cause of
2 37 MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-937(3) (1991) (Montana law regarding suits against
dissolved corporations and their shareholders "appl[ies] to foreign corporations and their
shareholders transacting business in [Montana] for any claims otherwise arising or accruing
under Montana law.").
238 225 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Ct. App. 1986).
23 9 See Steven C. Bahls, Montana's New Business Corporation Act: Duties,
Dissenon, Denvative Actions and Dissolunon, 53 MoNT. L. REv. 3, 50 (1992).
240 225 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
241 Id. at 880-81. Although this statement seems to rely on the corporation's
registration to do business in California, it does not, notably, rely on any notion of consent,
but on one of fairness. The court referred to a provision of the California Constitution that
provided that "'[njo corporation organized outside the limits of this State shall be allowed to
transact business within tis State on more favorable conditions than are prescribed by law
to similar corporations organized under the laws of tlus State.'" Id. at 881 (quoting CAL.
CONST. art. XII, § 15 (repealed 1972)). The court observed that this section was in force
when the California statute governing suits against dissolved corporations was enacted and
that though the constitutional provision was repealed in 1972, its repeal was said to be a
housekeeping measure only and to intend no change in law. Id. at 881-82. For that reason,
the court read the statute in accordance with the repealed constitutional section. Id. at 882.
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action and the injuries that were incurred took place within the state of
California," 242 the court applied California law to allow the suit.
Courts in other states have reached similar conclusions. Most make similar
arguments of fairness, saying that a corporation doing business in a state should
be subject to the restrictions m that state2 43 or that if a corporation seeks the
benefits of doing business in a state, then it must also bear the costs. 244 Other
courts have relied on the corporation's greater connections with the forum state
than with the state of incorporation. 245 Some cases, it is true, apply the law of
the state of incorporation, but those cases are for the most part quite old and
apply a strict entity theory that would probably not be accepted today.246 More
recently, even the cases that apply the law of the state of incorporation do so in
situations in which that decision does not disadvantage forum-state residents247
242 Id. at 880.
243 See, e.g., W.T. Ratliff Co., Inc. v. Henley, 405 So. 2d 141, 144 (Ala. 1981) ("On
public policy grounds, it would be unconscionable to allow a foreign corporation to do
business in our state and then permit it upon its own volition and without any time limitation
to leave those whom it has damaged with no recourse after its subsequent dissolution.").
244 See, e.g., Advance Mach. Co. v. Berry, 378 So. 2d 26, 27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979), in which the court stated:
To do so would permit a foreign corporation, which had done business in this State, to
escape the effects of its tortious conduct after the expiration of only two years when the
Florida law provided that liability should exist for at least three years. If the foreign
corporation desired to take the benefits of doing business in Florida, then it should be
subject to the same limitations as applicable to a domestic corporation upon dissolution.
Id. (footnote omitted).
245 See Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385, 391 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (applying
forum-state law because corporation did business only m forum state, but noting that result
under law of state of incorporation would have been the same).
246 See, e.g., Marion Phosphate Co. v. Perry, 74 F. 425, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1896);
Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 190 N.W.2d 521,524-25 (Wis. 1971).
247 See Gassert v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 392, 393-94 (Minn.
1979) (applying law of state of incorporation, but concluding that forum-state plaintiff's
action was brought within corporate survival period). The law of the state of incorporation
has also been applied to contract actions under the rationale that contract creditors accepted
the terms of the corporation's state of incorporation, but that approach would not apply to
tort victims. See Bayer v. Sarot, 381 N.Y.S.2d,489, 490-91 (App. Div. 1976) ("Persons
outside of the state of domicile of the dissolved corporation are charged with knowledge of
its statutes and are bound by them.") (citations omitted), aftd, 364 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y.
1977).
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or where the result would be the same under either law. 248
Thus, the corporate dissolution cases seem to favor application of the law
of the state in which the action arose. These cases do not, however, apply, at
least explicitly, the sort of tort law-corporation law calculus advocated in the
previous section. But when one considers the context of the dissolution cases,
that is not surprising. When a corporation is dissolving, it is no longer possible
to promote the goals of corporate law,249 and it seems logical that tort law
should prevail. The situation is more difficult with unlimited shareholder
liability and an ongoing corporation; in that case, corporate-law goals as well
as tort-law goals are at stake, and a balance between the two bodies of law
must be struck. Although the dissolution cases cannot help with this task, they
do at least show that the law of the state of incorporation need not
automatically be chosen whenever shareholder returns from corporate activities
are at issue.
C. International Choice of Law and Enforcement
As a theoretical matter, the choice-of-law problems in the international
context are not significantly different from those in the domestic context.
Outside the United States, the choice-of-law rules applied to corporations have
been similar to those of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: internal
corporate matters have been governed by the law of the country of
incorporation, 250 but a corporation's relations with third parties have been
governed by the law applicable to the substantive relationship at issue.25 1 More
248 See Country Cupboard, Inc. v. Texstar Corp., 570 S.W.2d 70, 72-73 (rex. Civ.
App. 1978) (applying law of state of incorporation to decide that dissolved corporation has
power to sue, but noting that result would be the same under forum law).
249 It is possible to promote the goals of corporate dissolution law, such as finality and
certainty, and the cases do indeed take those goals into account. See, e.g., North Am.
Asbestos Corp. v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 877, 880 (Ct. App. 1986). Those goals,
however, seem primarily to benefit the dissolving corporation's shareholders, whereas the
goals of corporate law can benefit society at large.
250 Internationally, the country of incorporation is sometimes seen as less important
than its sige rel ("real seat"), the country of its domicile, RoBERT R. PENNINGTON,
COMPANmEs IN THE CoMMON MARKT 98 (2d ed. 1970), but "[t]he law of the country of
incorporation or the siege rel, whichever theory is accepted, not only determines the
company's existence, but also in general governs the company's internal proceedings. ."
Id. at 100.
251 See id. at 101, stating:
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importantly, though, American courts deciding international choice-of-law
issues typically apply rules similar to those that they use in deciding between
the laws of different states of the United States.252 Therefore, because a tort
victim in an unlimited-liability state seeking compensation from a foreign
corporation (or from a domestic corporation with foreign shareholders) almost
certainly would bring suit in the unlimited-liability state,25 3 the victim would
probably be as likely to receive an unlimited-liability judgment against the
foreign corporation as he would against a domestic corporation.
As a practical matter, though, the absence of an international equivalent of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause means that it is not enough that a victim in an
unlimited-liability state obtain a judgment against a foreign corporation. Even if
a U.S. court were to issue such a judgment, the victim would have to seek
enforcement of that judgment against shareholders in other countries. As a
matter of international law, there are two reasons why such enforcement might
be demed. First, a U.S. court might lack personal jurisdiction over a foreign
shareholder. 25 4 Second, enforcement of an unlimited-liability judgment might
A company's proper law does not necessarily govern transactions with outsiders.
These are governed by the proper law of the contract or other dealing, just as if the
company had been an individual. Moreover, questions mcidental to such transactions
which concern the company's capacity or the powers of its representatives to bird it
will be governed by the same law.
Id.
2 5 2 See RESTATEMENT (rHIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES
§ 213, Reporters' Note 5 (1986) (noting that the principles of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, though developed to resolve conflicts between the states of the United
States, are also applied in the international context) (citing Hausman v. Buckley, 299 F.2d
696 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 885 (1962)); see also Robert B. Thompson,
United States Jurisdiction over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law
Aspects, 15 LAw& POL. INTLBus. 319, 377-78 (1983).
253 The victim would be treated no less favorably (and probably more favorably) mo
that jurisdiction, and it would be less expensive to bring suit there.
2 54An absence of personal jurisdiction will justify non-enforcement in both the U.S.
and foreign countries. In the U.S., for example, twenty-five states, including California,
New York, and Texas, had by 1994 adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act. See UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENS REcoNrroN Acr, 13 U.L.A.
63, 63 (1995 Supp.) (listing jurisdictions). The Act provides that a foreign country's
judgment is not conclusive if "the foreign court did not have personal junsdiction over the
defendant." UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENS RECoGNrrION Acr § 4(a)(2), 13 U.L.A.
261, 268 (1986). Similar provisions are applicable elsewhere. See, e.g., Convention on
Junsdiction and the Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments, Sept. 27, 1968, arts.
[VCol. 56:815
UNLIMITED LIABILTY
be seen as against the public policy of the country in which it was sought to be
enforced.25 5
Neither of these two reasons for non-enforcement would apply to foreign
shareholders of U.S. corporations. Such shareholders would have the same
notice of their potential unlimited liability as would U.S. shareholders, so
jurisdiction over them would be appropriate for the same reasons. 25 6
26, 27(2), 31, 34, 1969 Bull. Eur. Comm., No. 2, Supp. 17, 29-31 (providing for
recognition and enforcement by contracting states of judgments of other contracting states,
but that recognition "shall ... not be accorded" and enforcement "may be dismissed" if
"the defaulting defendant was not served with the summons conectly and in good time for
hun to arrange for his defence").
255 See, e.g., UNIFORM FOREIGN MoNEY-JuDGmENTs RECOGNMON Acr § 4(b)(3), 13
U.L.A. 261, 268 (1986) (foreign country's judgment need not be recognized if it "is
repugnant to the public policy of this state"); Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments, Sept. 27, 1968, arts. 26, 27(1), 31, 34,
1969 Bull. Eur. Comm., No. 2, Supp. 17, 29-31 (providing for recognition and
enforcement by contracting states of judgments of other contracting states, but that
recognition "shall ... not be accorded" and enforcement "may be dismissed" if judgment
is "contrary to 'public policy' m the State applied to"); cf Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d
862, 866-67 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (deciding that enforcing an Israeli judgment piercing the
corporate veil was not against U.S. public policy). It should be noted that, formally at least,
a refusal to enforce a judgment as against public policy is not the same as a re-examination
of the merits of the judgment. See, e.g., UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGmENS
RECOGNITION Acr § 3, 13 U.L.A. 261, 265 (1986) (foreign judgment that meets the
requirements of the Act "is conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or
demes recovery of a sum of money"); Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Civil and Commercial Judgments, Sept. 27, 1968, arts. 19, 35, 1969 Bull. Eur. Comm.,
No. 2, Supp. 17, 30-31 (stating that in or under "no circumstances may the foreign
judgment be reviewed as to the merits"). The public-policy test will allow enforcement even
m cases m which the enforcing court would have reached a different decision on the merits.
See Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. A.W Galadan, 610 F. Supp. 114, 118
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Under New York law ... foreign decrees and proceedings will be
given respect under principles of international comity in the absence of significant
countervailing public policy reasons, even if the result under the foreign proceeding would
be different than under American law.") (citations omitted), affid in part, vacated in part on
other grounds, 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985).
256 It is possible, of course, that some foreign courts would not recognize the bases for
jurisdiction discussed supra parts III & IV However, some foreign shareholders would have
significant contacts with the United States in any case, and others might be -subject to
jurisdiction as a result of their use of U.S. bank accounts (perhaps for receipt of dividends),
see, e.g., United Rope Distributors, Inc. v. Kimberly Line, 770 F Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.
1991), or their trading through U.S. brokerage firms, see, e.g., S.E.C. v. Foundation Hai,
736 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affid in relevant part on other grounds, S.E.C. v.
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Furthermore, a foreign country's corporation law, which would be the source
of its public policy, if any, against unlimited liability, would apply only to
corporations incorporated (or donucileP 57) in that country. For a U.S.-
incorporated corporation, the only limited-liability policy .that would be
implicated would be that of the U.S. state of incorporation, and even a foreign
court would presumably defer to a U.S. court's weighing of that policy. 25 8 As
Judge Oda of the International Court of Justice said in his concurring opinion
in the ELSI case,25 9
Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1990) (relying on effects of defendant's
trading activities m U.S.).257 See supra note 250.
258 A refusal to enforce the judgment on public policy grounds would require a
conclusion that it is public policy of the European forum that its citizens be subject only to
limited liability, regardless of the law of the country under whch the corporation they invest
is organized. See Thompson, supra note 252, at 378 ("One state is not likely to insist on
limited liability to encourage investment in a second state if the second state does not want
the economic benefits that limited liability is said to encourage.").
259 Case Concerning Elettromea Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15
(July 20). In the ELSI case, the International Court of Justice considered claims of the
United States under its Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaty) with
Italy. The United States has concluded FCN treaties with many of its important trading
partners, including Korea, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Denmark, Israel, Italy, China,
and France. See Sean D. Murphy, The ELSI Case: An Investmwnt Dispute at the
International Court of Jurtice, 16 YALE J. INT'LL. 391, 394-99 & 396 n.15 (1991) (giving
brief history of United States FCN treaties). The United States has also entered into bilateral
investment treaties, see i& at 397-98 & 397 n.19, but those treaties apply generally to
developing countries, so they are less relevant in the present context.
In ELSI, the United States claimed that the requisition by the Mayor of Palermo of the
plant and related assets of an Italian corporation that was wholly owned by Raytheon Co., a
U.S. corporation, was a violation of provisions of the FCN Treaty that gave U.S. nationals
the right "to organize, control and manage" corporations in Italy and that protected the
property rights of U.S. nationals in Italy. The court rejected the claims on the grounds that
Raytheon in fhct lost its rights in ELSI not due, to the requisition, but to "the precarious
financial state of ELSI, ultimately leading inescapably to bankruptcy." Id. at 81.
Judge Oda in Is concurring opinion focused specifically on the rights of Raytheon as
the shareholder of ELSI, observing that the United States should have relied on the
provisions of the FCN Treaty that protect the interests of Raytheon as a shareholder, "albeit
in an indirect way." Id. at 92 (Oda, J., concurring). (The judgment had referred to the
question of whether Raytheon's indirect rights as a shareholder were protected, but it
declined to resolve the question. Id. at 70-71.) Even under that interpretation, though,
Judge Oda noted that there had been no showing that ELSI had been treated less favorably
than corporations controlled by Italians, wuch he said disposed of the United States claim.
Id. at 92-93 (Oda, J., concurring).
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It is a great privilege to be able to engage in business in a country other
than one's own. By being permitted to undertake commercial or manufacturing
activities or transactions through businesses incorporated m another country,
nationals of a foreign country will obtain further benefits. Yet these local
companies, as legal entities of that country, are subject to local laws and
regulations; so that foreigners may have to accept a number of restrictions in
return for the advantages of doing business through such local companies.2 60
If, however, a U.S. court issued a judgment imposing unlimited liability on
the foreign shareholders26 1 of a foreign corporation, enforcement could be
difficult. Because the foreign corporation might have no obligation to disclose
to its shareholders their possible liability exposure, the basis for jurisdiction
over the shareholders might not be apparent. Even for those shareholders over
whom jurisdiction could be obtained, 262 a foreign court could treat its
corporation law as an expression of a policy against unlimited liability and
therefore refuse enforcement. 263 The likelihood of such an action, though, is
260 Id. at 90-91 (Oda, I., concurring).
261 An attempt to enforce a U.S. judgment against U.S. shareholders of a foreign
corporation could be made in a U.S. court, so the Full Faith and Credit Clause would apply
to mandate enforcement.
262 See upra note 256.
263 The foreign corporation would have to have legitimate connections with its state of
incorporation, though; it is unlikely that a U.S. corporation could incorporate a subsidiary
in Europe specifically to avoid unlimited liability in the United States. This point was
touched on m Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd.
(Belgium v. Spain), 1970 LC.J. 3 (Feb. 5). In Barcelona Traction, Belgium brought claims
on behalf of Belgian shareholders in a Canadian corporation that had been the subject of a
bankruptcy judgment in Spain, and whose assets there had been seized. The court rejected
the claims on the grounds that the Spanish action was one against the corporation, not
against the shareholders, so that the claims could properly have been brought only by
Canada. However, the International Court of Justice pointed out, apparently with approval,
that some States refuise to give their protection to compames incorporated there unless they
have a business or a substantial number of shareholders there, and it said that "[o]nly then,
it has been held, does there exist between the corporation and the State in question a
genuine connection of the land familiar from other branches of international law." Id. at 42.
See also RESTATEMENT (CriRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW oF THE UNrrED STATES § 213
cmt. c (1986) ("As in the case of an individual, a state may refuse to treat a corporation as a
national of the state that created it, and reject diplomatic protection by that state, where
there is no 'genuine link' between them.") (citing RESTATEMENT (TRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIO)s LAWOFTmE UNrrED STATES § 211 cmt. c (1986), which discusses the concept of
a "genuine link"); Thompson, supra note 236, at 380-96 (advocating weighing of national
interests, rather than strict use of law of country of incorporation, to determine propriety of
applying U.S. law to foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations); cf. First Nat'l City Bank v.
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Uncertain. 2 6 4 The United States has bilateral investment treaties with many
foreign countries, and most such treaties provide only that foreign corporations
doing business in the U.S. be treated no less favorably than U.S.
corporations. 265 Moreover, the European Community seems more willing, at
Banco para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (holding that the separate
juridical status of a public corporation established by the government of Cuba, though
presumptively valid, could be ignored to prevent the Cuban government from bringing suit
in"the U.S. courts while at the same time using the corporation to slueld itself from a
counterclaim).
26 4 The only case that I have been able to find on point is Risdon Iron & Locomotive
Works v. Furness, [19061 1 K.B. 49 (Eng. C.A.), in which California creditors of an
English limited-liability company sought to impose liability on one of the company's
shareholder under California's unlimited-liability law. The court rejected liability, but
emphasized that it did so because liability was sought to be Imposed "merely from the
provisions in the [articles of incorporation]" that authorized the company to do business m
California. Id. at 56. The articles, however, did not refer specifically to California, id. at
50, and the court apparently relied on that fact:
I do not express an opinion as to how the case would stand if the defendant were shewn
to have in fact assented to the company carrying on business in California on the terms
that he should incur personal liability in accordance with the law of that State. If this
were shewn, or if facts were proved from which it could be infrerred that he had
authorized the mode of trading under the particular conditions which imposed a liability
on hun, the case nught be different.
Id. at 56. Thus, the court at least tentatively suggested a test similar to the one suggested
above for jurisdictional purposes, i.e., a test that looks to the shareholder's actual or
constructive knowledge of the unlimited-liability law of the state in which its corporation is
doing business.
Because of the rarity of unlimited liability, there are few other cases to which one can
look. However, Professor Pennington says that German courts have held that "the personal
liability of shareholders on contracts made by their company is governed by the proper law
of the contract." PENNINGTON, supra note 250, at 101 (citing Judgment of Oct. 29, 1938,
RG, 159 Entscheidungen des Reichsgenchts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 33; Judgment of May 27,
1910, RG, 73 RGZ 366). Professor Penmngton also notes, though, that no other European
courts have done the same. Id.
265 See, e.g., M. SORNARAjAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
250-52 (1994). Professor Sornarajah discusses bilateral investment treaties and observes that
national treatment is the most favorable to foreign investors of the several standards of
treatment in such treaties. Id. at 251. His description of the implications of national
treatment makes clear, though, that under it unlimited liability could be applied to foreign
investors if the same treatment were applied to U.S. investors: "National treatment may,
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least in parent-subsidiary and other related-corporation situations, to pierce the
veil than are U.S. courts. 266 And at least one commentator has suggested that
the laws of the member states of the European Community, and of the
Community itself, are shifting away from limited liability. 267 Nevertheless, the
possibility exists that a foreign court would refuse to enforce a U.S. unlimited-
liability judgment, and it is worth considering the impact of that possibility on
the effectiveness of unlimited liability.
It seems unlikely that foreign investment difficulties would subvert a U.S.
state's imposition of unlimited liability. First, it might be possible to eliminate
the ability of shareholders of a foreign corporation to resist enforcement of an
unlimited-liability judgment. Professors Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that
such "international opportunism" could be prevented by, for example,
denying the right to conduct certain types of business within the United States
to any firm incorporated in a nation that refuses to recognize unlimited liability
for corporate torts, or requirng the posting of bond or proof of adequate
insuanee for potential tort damages by such a corporation before it can
conduct busmess.2 68
Second, even if such preemptive techniques were unsuccessful, the
problem itself might not be a large one. As discussed above, enforcement
would present a difficulty only for corporations that were both incorporated m
and legitimately based in foreign countries. 269 Although the number of such
corporations doing business in the U.S. that could incur tort liabilities greater
than their assets is probably not zero, it is also probably not large. It seems
likely that, on the whole, corporations doing business internationally are larger,
and hence more likely to have assets sufficient to meet tort judgments against
however, rebound on the foreign investor. A harsh measure taken against the nationals may
be extended to the foreign investor on the basis of national treatment." Id.26 6 See Eran Aharon Lev, European Community Competition Law: Is the Corporate
Veil Lifted Too Often?, 2 . TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y. 199, 204-26 (1993) (discussing the
EEC's Economic Unit Theory). See also Yitzhak Hadan, The Choice of National Law
Applicable to the Multinational Enterprise and the Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974
DUKE L.J 1. It is not entirely clear what one should make of this. It might suggest that
European courts would be more receptive to unlimited liability; it might also suggest that,
because veil-piercing is available, there would be less justification for unlimited liability.
267 See David L. Perrott, Changes in Attitude to Linited Liability-the European
Experience, in Lra .ABILrry AND THE CORPORATION 81, 106-15 (Tony Orhnial ed.
1982).268 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 1922-23.
269 See supra note 263 and text accompanying notes 261-65.
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them, than are domestic corporations. This would be particularly true for
corporations in those areas, such as pharmaceutical and chemical
manufacturing, that would be especially likely to generate an unlimited-liability
judgment. Thus, although one cannot rule out the possibility that foreign
enforcement could present some difficulties for unlimited liability, it is far from
clear that the obstacles would seriously diminish its overall effectiveness.
VI. FINANCIAL-MARKET OBSTACLES TO UNLIMITED LIABILrTY
Professor Grundfest's financial-market arguments rely on the existence of
"a class of shareholders... having substantial investable wealth without
having assets that plaintiffs could reach under a regime of proportionate
liability." 270 Shareholder wealth could be unreachable, he says, "because of the
constitutional and practical problems" of collecting proportionate liability
("unlimited-liability") judgments.271 Although Professor Grundfest argues,
relying on Professor Alexander's article, that these constitutional and practical
problems would exist both domestically and internationally, the argument was
made above272 that domestic shareholders' assets would be reachable under
unlimited liability. For foreign shareholders, the issue is less clear. As the last
section pointed out,273 there would probably not be any legal difficulty in
reaching the assets of foreign shareholders of at least U.S. corporations, but
there could be practical difficulties, primarily because those assets might be
difficult to find.274 Hence, this is the stronger aspect of Professor Grundfest's
argument, and it is the one that will be addressed here.275
Professor Grundfest presents three basic ways in which the existence of
shareholders with difficult-to-reach assets-what he calls "attachment-proof'
shareholders and I will call "remote" shareholders 276-could subvert an
attempt to impose unlimited liability. These three methods are arbitrage among
270 Grundfest, supra note 9, at 395.
271 Id.
272 See supra parts DI & IV (constitutional problems), part III.B (practical problems).
273 See supra text accompanying notes 258-60.
274 See Grundfest, supra note 9, at 398 & n.44.
275 Because foreign equity ownership is the worst-case scenario, much of the argument
here applies as well to domestic shareholders, thus supplementing the arguments presented
earlier.
276 As will become apparent below, Grundfest's use of the term "attachment-proof,"
see, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 9, at 389, begs the central issue in his argument. "Remote"
is a less conclusory adjective, and is also used, though less frequently, by Grundfest. See,
e.g., id. at400.
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different groups of investors, 277 alterations in the capital structure of corporate
issuers, 278 and the creation of new derivative financial instruments by third
parties.279 Professor Grundfest explicitly relies on the existence of remote
investors for only the first of these approaches, 280 but their existence is no less
necessary for the other two.28 1 Therefore, this part of the article proceeds by
first examining the likelihood and the significance of the existence of a class of
remote investors. I conclude that some such investors might exist, but their
number would probably not be great and their existence would in any event not
prevent the price of risky equity from dropping. The subsequent sections then
show why a drop in risky equity prices would prevent each of Professor
Grundfest's three avoidance mechanisms from defeating unlimited liability.
Finally, the last section briefly discusses an example of unlimited liability that
currently exists in the financial market: short sales. None of the effects
predicted by Professor Grundfest has evolved for short sales, suggesting that
they would also not evolve for unlimited liability
A. Remote Shareholders and Equity Prices
Professor Grundfest contends that financial-market effects would prevent
unlimited liability from changing the prices of risky equity.282 For this to be
true, all of the risky equity must be owned by investors for whom the
possibility of unlimited liability is a matter of no concern. 283 Professor
277 Id. at 394.
278 Id. at 407.
279 I at 408.
280 Id. at 394.
281 There is actually one exception, which is discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 314-15.
282 See Grundfest, supra note 9, at 392-93.
2 83 At one point, Professor Grundfest says that it is not actually necessary that all risky
equity be held by attachment-proof investors, only that the price of the equity be set by the
attachment-proof investors. Id. at 400 n.52. He says that that condition will be met as long
as the marginal shareholders are attachment-proof. Id. If Professor Grundfest intends by this
to say that unlimited liability would meet its goals only in part if a corporation is owned by
both attachable and attachment-proof investors, that is true. If, however, he intends to
suggest that so long as the marginal shareholders are attachment-proof, the goals of
unlimited liability will be entirely evaded, that is incorrect. If some investors are attachable,
both the compensatory and deterrent aspects of unlimited liability will in part be met. The
compensatory goals will be met to the extent that liability can be imposed on the attachable
shareholders. The deterrent goals will also be met, though, to the extent that the price paid
by marginal shareholders (whoever they are) is lower because the attachable shareholders
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Grundfest provides little information to suggest that this is likely. It is perhaps
true, as he suggests, that risky equity would be disproportionately owned by
investors whose assets were difficult to reach. It does not follow, however, that
the riskiness of the equity would therefore have no price effects. As the
following sections discuss, a drop m the price of risky equity under unlimited
liability could result from at least three sources: an insufficient number of
remote investors, an unwillingness of remote investors to own risky equity
without compensation for the risk of an unlimited-liability judgment, and the
illiquidity that would result from the concentration of the ownership of risky
equity m the hands of a limited group of remote shareholders.
1. The Number of Remote Shareholders
It is not an easy task to estimate the amount of remote capital that would be
available to own risky equity At a minimum, one must compare the pool of
available remote capital with the amount of risky equity. In this vein, Professor
Grundfest observes that "[iun 1989, aggregate foreign purchases and sales of
securities in U.S. markets amounted to $416.3 billion."2 84 It is difficult,
however, to extract any relevant information from this number, for at least two
reasons. First, by referring both to purchases and sales, it places no limit on
how many times the transfer of a particular amount is counted. For example,
the transactions of a foreign investor who bought and sold a block of Union
are unwilling to accept the liability risk for free. In that case, the corporation is presumably
not owned entirely by attachment-proof investors because some such investors' expectations
regarding the corporation's prospects are not sufficiently good to make it an attractive
purchase despite the lower price reflecting attachable shareholders' unlimited-liability
concerns. (In other words, Grundfest's argument apparently posits a downward-sloping
demand curve for the risky equity. But as long as the shape of that curve is affected by
attachable investors' responses to the equity's liability risk, the price of the equity will also
be affected.)
It is possible, of course, that an attachable investor could choose to own some risky
equity, or could by agreement choose to bear some of the unlimited-liability risk of equity
owned by attachment-proof investors. In either case, the risky equity would not all be
owned by attachment-proof investors, but the price of the equity would drop directly to the
extent that its risk was borne by the attachabe investors.
284 Grundfest, supra note 9, at 398 (citing Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of
the World's Securities Markets: Econormc Causes and Regulatory Consequences, 4 . FIN.
SERVICES RES. 349, 353 (1990). Note that although Professor Grundfest refers to
"securities," the number he provides apparently refers to stocks only. See Office of the
Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin 99 (Sept. 1992) (for 1989, listing
the total foreign purchases of domestic stocks as $214.071 billion and total sales as
$204.129 billion, for an "aggregate" of $418.2 billion).
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Carbide shares three times during 1989 would have been counted six times in
the figure Grundfest provides; that investor's capital, though, could have been
used only once to purchase and hold risky U.S. equity. Second, the total dollar
amount of foreign trading is of little import unless compared to the amount of
risky capital to be bought.
In fact, the likelihood that foreign investors could purchase all United
States risky equity is low. Although the "aggregate foreign purchases and
sales" of U.S. stocks have, as Professor Grundfest says, been $350-400 billion
dollars in recent years,285 net foreign purchases have been much lower. Net
purchases from for the four years from 1988 to 1991 were in fact only $3.9
billion, with some years showing net purchases and others net sales.286 At the
end of 1991, the total capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange alone
was $3.71 trillion.287 Therefore, assuming that ten percent of NYSE issues
were perceived as presenting a risk of unlimited liability, foreign investment in
the U.S. equity markets would have to be 100 times the net 1988-1991
investment to hold all U.S. risky equity. That possibility seems unlikely and
Professor Grundfest has provided no evidence to support it.
Moreover, a large increase in foreign investment to purchase risky U.S.
equity is particularly unlikely because the imposition of unlimited liability
would not make risky equity more attractive to foreign investors. At most, if
foreign investors believed that they were at no risk of an unlimited-liability
judgment, risky equity would remain as attractive as it was prior to the
imposition of unlimited liability. So, however, would safe equity.2 88 For that
reason, to estimate the amount of capital available to purchase risky equity by
looking at total trading volume is misleading. A large fraction of the total
trading volume could be diverted to risky equity only if risky equity became
more attractive to investors, which would only occur-even if the investors
perceived no unlimited liability risk to themselves-if risky equity prices
dropped. This issue will be discussed more fully in the context of arbitrage
285 The actual totals have been the following: for 1988, $364.370 billion; for 1989,
$418.200 billion; for 1990, $361.712 billion; and for 1991, $411.320 billion. Office of the
Secretary, Department of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin 99 (Sept. 1992).
286 The numbers for the individual years were the following: for 1988, net sales of
$2.000 billion; for 1989, net purchases of $9.941 billion; for 1990, net sales of $15.126
billion; and for 1991, net purchases of $11.088 billion. Office of the Secretary, Department
of the Treasury, Treasury Bulletin 99 (Sept. 1992).
287 Douglas R. Sease, Why There May Be More Cash to Fuel a Rally, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 9, 1992, at Cl (Abreast of the Market).
288 Actually, a shift of some investors from risky equity to safe equity might rase
the pnce of safe equity somewhat. But smce there is presumably much more safe equity
than risky equity, this effect is likely to be small.
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below, 289 but it is worth noting here that if a risky corporation's share price
did drop, it would suggest that investors on the whole believed that there was a
significant risk that the corporation's liabilities could exceed its assets. Even if
a remote investor had not previously believed that herself, this indication of the
view of other investors might give her pause.
None of these points is weakened by the several real-world examples that
Professor Grundfest provides, each of which arose in a very different context.
He relies primarily on the existence of clientele effects, in which investors with
different characteristics tend to choose investments that complement their
needs. Professor Grundfest says that "[c]lientele effects... are not unusual in
modern capital markets," and he cites as examples tax clienteles, dividend
clienteles, and leverage clienteles. 290 Setting aside the fact that Professor
Grundfest's statement that the literature "documents" such clientele effects is
more unequivocal than the literature itself,29 1 clientele effects in these contexts
would say little about whether similar effects would arise in response to
unlimited liability. In each of the cases cited by Grundfest, investors divided
themselves into clienteles based on direct or redirect tax effects. In effect,
because of differing tax treatments, returns on various classes of equity differed
for different investors. 292 Those investors then, not surprisingly, chose the
289 See wfra part VI.B. 1.
290 Grandfest, supra note 9, at 393.
291 Professor Grundfest cites a number of articles in support of this claim. Although
some of them do indeed support it, others do not. For example, Grundfest cites one as
"displaying direct evidence of clientele effects." Id. at 393 n. 19 (citing Wilbur G. Lewellen
et al., Some Direct Evidence on the Dividend Clientele Phenomenon, 33 1. FIN. 1385
(1978)). The authors Grundfest cited, though, concluded it by saying that they were "unable
to find in the data much evidence to support the notion that an important dividend-tax-
clientele effect is in fact present." Wilbur G. Lewellen et al., Some Direct Evdence on the
Dividend Clientele Phenomenon, 33 J. FIN. 1385, 1394-95 (1978). Another article did find,
as Grundfest notes, a negative correlation between a corporation's financial leverage and its
investors' personal tax rates, see John M. Hams, Jr. et al., Evidence of Financial Leverage
Clienteles, 38 J. FIN. 1125 (1983), but that same article cites another, id. at 1131, not cited
by Grundfest, in which the authors concluded that "there [was] little indication of a
systematic negative relationship between [investor tax] rates and corporate leverage
policies," E. Han Kim et al., Financial Leverage Clienteles: Theory and Evidence, 7 J. FIN.
ECON. 83, 100 (1979). A third article cited by Grundfest is a purely theoretical, rather than
empirical, exploration of possible equilibrium relationships between bond term structures
and investor classes, defined by transaction costs and taxes. See Jaime Cuevas Dermody &
Eliezer Zeev Prisman, 43 J. FIN. 893 (1988).
292 For example, in Lewellen et al., supra note 291, the authors examine the
relationship between investors' marginal tax rates and the dividend yields of their
investments. An intuitively plausible hypothesis is that investors with high tax rates would
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equity investments that had the best return for them. This demonstrates only
that different investors, with different characteristics, are likely to find different
investments relatively more or less appealing; it does not ensure that when the
characteristics of an investment change, there will always remain sufficient
demand for it so that its price will not change.
An example will make this point more clear. It is quite possible that high-
tax-rate investors are more likely than low-tax-rate investors to prefer stocks
that provide their return as capital appreciation (taxed later as capital gains),
rather than as dividends (taxed now as ordinary income); conversely, low-tax-
rate investors may be (relatively) more likely to prefer to receive their returns
as dividends. This tells us little about what effect dividend yields have on stock
prices. It is possible, for example, that both kinds of investors prefer to receive
their returns as dividends (perhaps to avoid the risk that those returns might
vanish), but that low-tax-rate investors just prefer that more strongly. In that
case, the prices of stocks that provide their returns as capital appreciation
would be lower than those of stocks that return dividends; the pressure that
would lower the prices would be lessened by the existence of high-tax-rate
investors, it is true, but it would not be eliminated. The same point applies to
unlimited liability. It is likely that risky stocks would be priced lower in an
unlimited-liability world than in a limited-liability one, though the existence of
remote investors might temper the price drop somewhat.
Furthermore, another factor makes tax-related clientele effects a poor
analogy to unlimited liability: uncertainty. 293 The underlying sources of the
clientele effects that Professor Grundfest discusses-that is, the tax treatment of
corporate dividends and capital appreciation-are well-defined and certain.
Investors choosing investments based on these tax considerations do not need to
wonder whether they will benefit. When the effects of investors' decisions are
uncertain, however, investors cannot rely on those effects. This is true even for
the kinds of tax-related decisions involved in Professor Grundfest's clientele
effects, as was apparent in investors' unwillingness to shift from partnerships to
limited-liability companies until the Internal Revenue Service issued a ruling on
prefer to avoid stocks that provide returns m the form of dividends subject to those tax rates
(and instead would prefer to receive their returns m appreciation of the stock price, which
would be taxed at a lower capital-gains rate). If this hypothesis is true, one would expect to
see more low-dividend-yield stocks owned by lugh-tax-rate investors, and high-dividend
stocks would be owned disproportionately by low-tax-rate investors. As described briefly
supra note 291, the evidence regarding the existence of these kinds of clientele effects is
inconclusive.
293 I refer here to legal uncertainty, as distinguished from financial uncertainty.
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the tax treatment of such companies.294 This phenomenon is also seen in
investors' preference for incorporation in Delaware as a result of Delaware's
well-developed corporate law, which reduces the uncertainty of the
relationships among shareholders, their corporations, and the corporations'
officers and directors. 295
Remote investors m an unlimited-liability corporation would be subject to
considerable uncertainty regarding the possibility that their assets could be
reached. That would obviously be the case initially, until courts' views on
enforcing unlimited-liability judgments became clear. However, clarity might
in fact never be achieved, because courts' treatment of unlimited-liability cases
might differ with the circumstances of the particular corporations and
shareholders involved. Furthermore, shareholders would also be subject to
uncertainty resulting from their own activities. In determining whether they
were willing to subject themselves to unlimited liability, shareholders would
have to consider whether they might in the future establish contacts in the U.S.
that would, as a consequence, make them subject to jurisdiction here.2 96 All of
294 See, e.g., Marybeth Bosko, Note, The Best of Both Worlds: The Limited Liability
Company, 54 Orno ST. L.. 175, 179 (1993) (noting the initial uncertainty regarding the
Internal Revenue Service's treatment of limited-liability companies (LLCs) and observing
that "[gliven the uncertainties surrounding the LLC, it is not surprising that most companies
concluded that the risks involved with the LLC were not worth taking").
295 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 162, at 213 (noting that
Delaware's success in attracting incorporations comes from, among other things, "its large
body of precedents").
29 6 Uncertainty is only one example of informal mechanisms that could inhibit
investment. Informal pressure from U.S. interests that disapproved of foreign investors
evading unlimited liability is another possibility, as is suggested by an example offered by
Professor Grundfest. See Grundfest, supra note 9, at 393-94. He describes an investment
strategy pursued by Japanese insurance companies seeking to meet a Japanese regulatory
requirement that policy payments be made from current income, rather than capital gains.
To meet this requirement, the insurance companies purchased U.S. stocks prior to the
stocks' payment of dividends, then resold them almost immediately ax divdend, i.e.,
without the right to receive the dividend. At one time, these "dividend capture" transactions
made up a significant fraction of all New York Stock Exchange volume, but the volume of
such transactions has declined. According to Professor Grundfest, the decline has occurred
"because Japanese authorities have amended their insurance regulations to eliminate
insurers' incentives to engage in these dividend-stripping transactions." Id. at 394.
In fact, though, it appears that the reduction m dividend capture activity was due not so
much to formal regulatory action as to more informal disapproval in the United States. The
high dividend-capture volume-up to twenty-five or thirty percent of overall volume on
some days-raised concerns that it was skewing market indicators. William Power &
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these uncertainties would discourage remote investors from investing in risky
equity.
2. Risk of an Unlimited-Liability Judgment and Equity Prices
Uncertainties in the accessibility of investors' assets would not only
discourage investors from investing in risky stocks, they would also lower the
prices that investors would be willing to pay. The key point here is that
whether the assets of a given shareholder are subject to attachment is rarely
answerable either "yes" or "no." Instead, the accessibility of shareholder assets
occupies a continuum from very accessible-as for forum-state residents-to
effectively inaccessible-as for a foreign investor with few assets.297 Unlimited
liability would affect the price that an investor is willing to pay based on the
investor's position on this continuum. Investors who believed that their assets
were fully accessible would reduce the price that they were willing to pay by
their discounted estimate of the full unlimited-liability risk. Investors who
believed that they were fully "attachment-proof" would, as Professor Grundfest
says, be willing to pay the same price that they would pay in a limited-liability
regime. The vast majority of investors, who would fall between these extremes,
would be willing to pay a price somewhere between the limited-liability and
full-unlimited-liability prices.
Thus, it is an oversimplification to say that the existence of "attachment-
proof" investors would evade unlimited liability. It is all a matter of degree.
The unlimited-liability price of risky equity, and hence the effectiveness of
unlimited liability for that equity, would depend on an overall measure of the
accessibility of the assets of both remote and non-remote investors in that
equity. To claim that all such investors will be purely "attachment-proof' is to
Michael R. Sesit, Mama for Divdend Capture Subsides, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1989, at
Cl. As reported m the Wall Street Journal:
The Japanese got the message. "It got people annoyed. The Japanese just got tired
of the bad publicity," says market analyst Laszlo Birnyi, president of Birinyi
Associates Inc., New York. Japanese brokers say that Japan's Ministry of Finance
passed the word that investors Thould tone down their capture activity, and they did.
Id. The same article notes that Japanese insurers can now use some capital gains to make
policy payments, but suggests that that was a lesser factor in promoting the change. See id.
297 For example, the assets of mutual funds, which generally would have continuous
and systematic dealings with parties m all states, would therefore be accessible m all states.
The accessibility of the assets of other U.S. and foreign shareholders would depend on the
shareholders' specific dealings with the forum state, and with their states' treatment of the
unlimited-liability issue.
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beg the question. Moreover, as is described in the next section, even if there
were a class of purely "attachment-proof" investors, that would not necessarily
avoid the effects of unlimited liability.
3. Price Effects of an Illiquid Risky-Equity Market
Even assuming that there would be some investors who were willing to
invest in risky equity subject to unlimited liability, and even if some of those
investors would value their risk of being subject to unlimited liability at zero,
that would not establish that the prices for that risky equity would not drop as a
result of the imposition of unlimited liability. The simple fact that the pool of
investors who would be willing to invest in risky equity at prices unaffected by
the risk under unlimited liability would necessarily be smaller than the pool of
investors who would be willing to invest at that price if their liability were
limited could lower the price.298 That is so because investors who were willing
to buy unlimited-liability equity at a limited-liability price could only sell the
equity (at that price) to others in the same position. That would reduce the
liquidity of the equity, and liquidity has value, so the price would drop.
The most straightforward way to look at the liquidity issue is to realize that
investors who will find it difficult to sell their stocks will require a higher rate
of return than they would in the absence of that difficulty. 299 "Put differently,
29 8 Professor Leebron, m his article on unlimited liability, noted the liquidity problem
m response to the suggestion that risky equity would be owned by those with insufficient
wealth to make pursuing their assets worthwhile:
[Mlany markets function where the value of the product depends on some circumstance
of the buyer, such as wealth. Thus, it is not correct to assert that there will be more than
one market price for a share. Rather, shareholders with less wealth exposure may be
able to purchase shares for less than they value them. Of course, if there are enough
such shareholders who are willing to acquire more shares, then the value of the firm
will rise and shareholders with greater wealth exposure will sell. But the suggestion that
such shares would simply be accumulated by the poorest investors is not plausible.
Such investors do not have the assets for such accumulations, and they are likely to be
just as unwilling to risk all their wealth on a single investment as a wealthy shareholder.
In short, the problem is not that there will be more than one price; rather, as the wealth
effect becomes significant, the market will become thinner and eventually illiquid.
Leebron, supra note 1, at 1608-09 (footnote omitted).
29 9 See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, Liqudity and Cost of Capital Implications
for Corporate Management, in THE REVOLUrION IN CORPORATE FINANCE 89, 89 (Joel M.
Stem & Donald H. Chew, Jr. eds., 2d ed. 1992) ("[l]nvestors price securities according to
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given two assets with the same cash flows but with different liquidity, investors
will pay less for the asset with the lower liquidity." 3°° Yakov Amiliud and
Hahn Mendelson examine the consequences of this issue for corporate issuers.
They point out that low liquidity of an issuer's offerings will "represent a
significantly higher cost of capital." 30 1 The implication of this higher cost of
capital is that a corporate issuer of risky equity cannot escape a drop in its price
due to unlimited liability by moving its equity ownership overseas if the
smaller size of the market will make it difficult to sell its shares, or for its
investors to sell theirs.
Obviously, there is no empirical evidence as to how much the imposition
of unlimited liability would reduce the size of the equity market for risky
stocks.3°2 However, Amihud and Mendelson provide a useful analogy. They
refer to the issue by publicly-traded corporations of "letter" stocks, stocks that
are identical to the corporations' publicly-traded stocks, except that they are not
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and thus cannot be
publicly traded. 303 Because of letter stocks' restricted trading, Amihud and
Mendelson say, "[e]vidence suggests that letter stocks sell at a discount of
about 25% relative to their publicly-traded counterparts." 304 Another,
their returns net of trading costs; and they thus require higher returns for holding less liquid
stocks to compensate them for the higher cost of trading.").
300 Id.
301 1d. at90.
302 Liquidity is, however, one of the arguments for limited liability. See, e.g., z& at
95, stating:
By limiting stockholders' losses to the amount of their investment, the limited
liability provision increases the liquidity of stocks. Without limited liability, investors
would trade stocks very cautiously, the market would become thin and the bid-ask
spreads would be considerably higher since buyers and sellers would set prices to
protect themselves.
Id.
303 Id. at91.
304 IR Brealey and Myers make a similar point regarding corporate debt: "Lenders m
private placements have to be compensated for the risks they face and for the costs of
research and negotiation. They also have to be compensated for holding an illiquid asset."
RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MyERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 342 (3d
ed. 1988). Brealey and Myers state that a typical interest rate differential is "on the order of
50 basis points or .50 percentage points," id., which, for an interest rate of 10 percent m
1988, translates to a five percent lower return.
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somewhat more distant analogy is available m an international context.305
France has a law forbidding the removal from the country of certain national
treasures, among which are some paintings. The owner of van Gogh's Garden
at Auvers sought to sell the painting outside of France, where he believed that
it would receive a higher price than m France. In 1989, however, the French
Culture Ministry declared Garden at Auvers a national treasure, and the owner
was forced to sell it in Paris for $9.5 million. The seller then brought suit
seeking the difference m value between the price he was able to get selling the
painting in France and that which he would have received could he have sold in
a broader market, and the French court awarded him $72.7 million to cover the
difference between the painting's value here and abroad. 3°6 This scenario is
analogous to the one Professor Grundfest suggests for risky equity, with sales
of that equity confined to foreign investors. The two markets are considerably
different, of course, but this story suggests the potential magnitude of liquidity
effects.
Now, I do not claim here that either the 25% price reduction for letter
stocks or the 88% price reduction for the van Gogh is an accurate estimate of
the illiquidity price reduction that would occur for risky equity I do suggest,
though, that one cannot simply assert that confining risky equity purchases to a
subset, perhaps a small subset, of foreign investors will have no effect on the
prices of that equity. Instead, to show that the concentration of risky equity in
the hands of remote investors will not affect the price of the equity, one must
show that the pool of such investors is sufficiently large to avoid these liquidity
effects. That showing has not been made
B. The Liability-Limiting Mechanisms
Someone must own the equity of risky corporations, and under unlimited
liability whoever did so would bear the risk of liability. This consideration is
important when considering the specific mechanisms that Professor Grundfest
proposes for avoiding unlimited liability His proposals, with one exception,
rely on the claim that the price of risky equity would not change under
unlimited liability because it would all be owned by "attachment-proof'
investors. As the preceding sections showed, that claim is suspect, and the
following sections argue that the proposals that rely on it are therefore also
questionable. The one mechanism Grundfest suggests that does not rely on the
claim that equity prices would be unchanged under unlimited liability is a
305 This example is discussed m Alan Riding, A Van Gogh Becomes a Cause C.6l~bre,
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1994, at C3.
306 Id.
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straightforward shifting of corporate financing from equity to debt.30 7 That is,
he would have corporate creditors bear more of the risk of corporate failure
under unlimited liability than they do under limited liability However,
debtholders, like equityholders, will not bear risk for free; therefore, this
mechanism too would raise a risky corporation's capital costs, thus promoting
at least the deterrent, if not the compensatory, goals of unlimited liability.
1. Arbitrage with Remote Shareholders
Professor Grundfest's arbitrage argument is that, given the existence of
enough remote investors to purchase all available risky equity,30 8 those
investors could swap the equity returns from their risky equity (minus the
unlimited liability) for the equity returns of safe equity owned by attachable
investors, thus allowing both to replicate the limited-liability market
portfolio. 3°9 The purpose of this arbitrage would be to allow the remote
investors to rebalance their portfolios, so that even if they held only risky
equity, they could share in the returns of safe equity. Non-remote investors, on
the other hand, could share in the returns of risky equity without incurring the
risk of unlimited liability. This arbitrage plan would only work, however, if, as
Grundfest assumes, remote investors were willing to pay exactly the same price
for risky equity under unlimited liability as they would pay under limited
liability. To the extent that risky equity prices dropped under unlimited
liability, as the preceding sections argued they would, 310 non-remote investors
would have less reason to swap for the risky returns. 311
Furthermore, it would not be enough that remote investors valued their
risk from unlimited liability at zero; non-remote investors would have to agree
with that evaluation. If non-remote investors believed that remote investors
were at risk of an unlimited-liability assessment, they would pay less for the
remote investors' returns on risky equity. That is, the non-remote investors
307 This approach is discussed in more detail m the text accompanying notes 314-15
infra.
308see supra note 283.
309 See Grundfest, supra note 9, at 401.3 10 See supra part VI.A.
311 That is because the lower returns on the unlimited-liability risky equity would make
it less attractive than it was when liability was limited. Therefore, non-remote investors
would probably prefer the returns of safe equity, which would remain the same under
unlimited liability as it was under limited liability. It is still possible, though, that non-
remote investors would want the returns of unlimited-liability for other purposes, such as
diversification.
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would discount the value of the risky equity for the unlimited-liability risk that
they perceived, regardless of whether any risk was perceived by the remote
investors. This problem could perhaps be avoided if the remote investors
agreed to swap the returns of equity net of any unlimited-liability assessments.
It is possible, though, that if non-remote investors insisted on such a condition,
the remote investors might themselves re-evaluate their assessments of
unlimited-liability risk.
Finally, the arbitrage plan is also somewhat implausible for another reason.
Its basic idea is that non-remote investors would use arbitrage to obtain the
returns of risky equity without risking unlimited liability In other words, the
claim is that investors who wanted to invest in a particular corporation would,
at the same time, believe that the probability that the corporation's liabilities
would exceed its assets was sufficiently high to justify incurring the transaction
costs of the arbitrage to avoid unlimited liability. This scenario is not
impossible, of course. It could be that very low transaction costs, coupled,
perhaps, with a low probability of a high-magnitude loss, would lead investors
to behave in this way It seems more likely, though, that if investors thought
that the chances of bankruptcy were high enough to require incurring special
costs to avoid its effects, they would simply select another investment.
2. Adjustment of Debt/Equity Ratios
Professor Grundfest also suggests that corporations could issue a variety of
forms of debt in place of newly-expensive unlimited-liability equity. This
suggestion seems to indicate some uncertainty on the part of Professor
Grundfest as to whether the existence of remote investors would actually allow
the financial markets to avoid unlimited liability-if so, why the need to shift to
debt? Indeed, Grundfest says that "issuers will have an incentive to respond to
market signals by shrinking the pool of equity that is potentially subject to
proportionate liability because capital in that form will become relatively more
expensive." 312 Setting this issue aside, though, Professor Grundfest's
suggestions along this line take two basic approaches: the issuance of debt
securities that mimic the returns of equity, and a straightforward shifting of the
corporate balance sheet from equity to debt.
Professor Grundfest's first approach, the issuing of debt convertible to
equity, is of little force if, as was argued above,313 risky equity would become
more expensive under unlimited liability. If a risky corporation's equity prices
were lower as a result of unlimited liability, the equity-conversion element of
312 Grundfest, supra note 9, at 405.
313 See supra part VI.A.
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convertible debt would reflect that lowered price. Investors would be willing to
pay proportionately less for the convertible debt, raising the corporation's cost
of capital just as higher equity prices themselves would. Hence, the
convertibility element of Professor Grundfest's proposed equity-to-debt shift
adds little; the key element is the shift from equity to debt.
A corporation would shift from equity to debt only to the extent that doing
so would not raise its cost of capital. An equity-to-debt shift would, however,
be especially likely to raise capital costs for exactly the high-tort-risk
corporations for which Professor Grundfest suggests it. A risky corporation
must compensate its investors for the risk they incur by promising them a high
rate of return. It is usually more efficient for a risky corporation to offer that
return through an equity claim on its residual value than through fixed (and
high) interest payments, for several reasons. First, the high risk is presumably
balanced by a high potential payoff, and equityholders, unlike debtholders, will
share in that payoff. Second, a debt-heavy structure is likely to make it difficult
for a risky corporation to meet its interest obligations: "Other things equal,
distress is more likely for firms with high business risk. That is why such firms
generally issue less debt." 314 Finally, it is typically easier for equity investors,
rather than creditors, to diversify to reduce the risks that they face.315 These
are the basic reasons why equity markets develop in the first place, and those
reasons are stronger, not weaker, in the case of risky corporations.
3. Creation of New Financial Instnunents
Professor Grundfest's final approach, the creation of new financial
instruments that would formally be debt but that would mimic the value of
risky equity issues, suffers from the same problem as the convertible-debt
approach discussed above: it depends purely on the maintenance of risky equity
prices at their limited-liability levels. If risky equity's value declined as a result
of unlimited liability, the price of any financial instrument based on the equity's
value would also decline. That is, like the arbitrage and convertible-debt
approaches, this one would not be an independent means of avoiding limited
liability, but would simply be a means to package risky equity-whatever its
characteristics under unlimited liability might be-in another form. Some
investors still would have to own the equity, and, as described above,316
3 14 BRUALEy & MyERS, supra note 304, at 435.
315 That is true both because equity claims are often smaller than corporate debt claims
and because the liquidity of equity is typically greater than that of debt.
316 Se supra part VI.A.
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Professor Grundfest has not shown that they would be willing to do so without
compensation for the risk and liquidity problems it would present.
C. An Unlimited-Liability Analogy: Short Sales
It is useful at this point to turn from the theory of the preceding sections to
a real-world analogy to unlimited liability: short stock sales. 317 The sale of a
share of stock short is the reverse of the purchase of a share of unlimited-
liability stock. Both present a similar risk of unlimited liability: the stock
purchase if the price goes down, the short sale if it goes up. It is worthwhile,
therefore, to consider whether the same liability-evasion strategies that
Professor Grundfest says would be used by unlimited-liability shareholders are
also used by short-sellers. The question is an especially interesting one because
the creditors in the case of a stock purchase are in a sense better protected than
those in a short sale, even with the S.E.C.'s short-sale margin requirements. 318
The creditors in the case of a stock purchase are the corporation's creditors,
who are protected by the amount that the purchaser has invested, i.e., the value
of the stock.319 The creditor in the case of a short sale is the seller's broker,
who is responsible for providing the stock when the sale is consummated if the
seller does not.320 The broker is required by the S.E.C. to maintain a margin
account for the seller, which is designed specifically to ensure that there will be
sufficient funds available to purchase the stock, even if its price rises. 321 The
3 17 To sell a share of stock short is to sell a share that one does not own. The short
seller hopes that the price of the stock will go down, so that he can buy it later, to meet the
sale obligation, at the lower price, and keep the difference as his profit.
318 See infra text accompanymg notes 320-26.
319 This assumes that the market has valued the corporation's going-concern value
accurately. If the corporation were liquidated, its liquidation value would probably be
somewhat less than the corporation's market capitalization.
32 0 See Reg. T § 2(b), 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(b) (1995) (defining brokers and dealers as
creditors for the purpose of the short-selling margin requirements).
321 There is nothing to prevent brokers from agreeing with their customers on margin
requirements, either as to amount or time, that are more strict than those required by
regulation, and they typically do so. But the broker still may not be able to prevent the
customer's margin account from being exhausted, either because a price rise occurs too
rapidly or because the broker does not want to damage its relationship with its customer by
liquidating the customer's position too quickly. I have been informed by a member of the
brokerage industry that after price rises brokers are in fact sometimes left liable to make up
their customers' short positions.
Nevertheless, the fact that the S.E.C. requires brokers to maintain margin accounts at a
certain level is interesting in itself. The S.E.C. requirements suggest that brokers might not
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question, then, is how well does the protection offered by the margin
requirements compare with the protection provided by a simple stock purchase?
The S.E.C.'s margin regulations require that a short-seller deposit only
50% more than the market value of the stock.322 Hence, the seller's broker is
protected against a price rise of only 50% of the initial investment, whereas m
the case of a stock purchase creditors are protected against a price drop of
100% of the initial investment. The comparison is complicated somewhat,
however, by margin maintenance requirements. If the price of a stock sold
short goes up, the broker can request the short-seller to increase the amount m
his margin account to maintain the 50% margin.323 The short-seller has five
days to meet the margin call, 32 4 after which time the seller may liquidate the
seller's securities to meet the requirement. 325 Therefore, the broker is really
only exposed to stock price increases beyond the 50% margin requirement if
those increases take place in less than five days. 326 There are, however, events
that, relatively frequently, cause large, rapid stock price increases: tender
offers. The premiums offered over market prices in tender offers average
approximately 50% .327 The market prices then typically rise rapidly to near the
do so on their own. That, m turn, suggests that brokers are not especially concerned about
evasion strategies.
322 Reg. T § 5(b)(1), Supp., 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.5(b)(1), 220.19(c) (1995). The New
York Stock Exchange generally requires that if the value of the stock goes up, the margin
level be maintained at the market value. N.Y. Stock Exchange Rules 431(c)(2)-(4),
repnnted in N.Y. Stock Exchange Guide (CCH) 2431.
323 Reg. T § 4(c), 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c) (1995).
3 24 Reg. T § 4(c)(3), 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(3) (1995); Reg. T § 2(w), 12 C.F.R.
§ 220.2(w) (1995); SEC Rule 15c6-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1 (1995).
325 Reg. T § 4(d), 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(d) (1995).
326 It should be noted that events that would create tort liability for unlimited-liability
shareholders would also probably take place over a short time. That would be true of
catastrophic torts, like the Bhopal disaster, and could also be true for other torts under the
rules proposed by Professors Hansmann and Kraakman for determining whether tort
liability would attach to shareholders. See supra note 4.
327"See, e.g., Robert Comment & Gregg A. Jarrell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender
Offers: The Impnsonment of the Free-Riding Shareholder, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 297 (1987)
Cm tender offers for any or all shares between 1981 and 1984, mean premiums were 50.7%
when offers were negotiated with target firm management and 68.0% when they were not,
for an overall average of 56.1%); Grand Metropolitan Launches Bid of $5.12 Billion for
Pillsbwy Co., WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1988, at A3 (53.8% premium); Philip Moms Cos. Is
Bidding $90 a Share for Kraft Inc. in $11 Billion Tender Offer, WALL ST. I., Oct. 18, 1988,
at A3 ("50% premium"); Ainencan Home Offers $8.5 Billion for Cyanamd, WALL ST. I.,
Aug. 3, 1994, at A3 ("nearly a 50% premium"); see also Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman
Brothers Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 749 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he rule of
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tender-offer price, or even to a higher price if competing bidders are
expected.3 28 Tender offers therefore present exactly the sort of sudden price
increase of 50% or more of a stock's market price that exposes short-sellers,
and their broker-creditors, to unlimited liability
It thus seems that short-selling would present the same sort of opportunity
for evasion tactics that Professor Grundfest claims would occur on the
imposition of unlimited liability. Although remote investors would probably
not be likely candidates for evasion, because the contractual short-sale
arrangement between seller and broker would probably be enforced by even
foreign courts, there are other possibilities. Why, for example, do we not see
thumb for calculating the minimum acceptable offer [in 1982-1983] was a 50% premium
above the pre-announcement price of the target shares") (citations omitted).
328 See, e.g., Steve Swartz & Judith Valente, Odds Are Against Kra in Takeover
Fight, WALL ST. I., Oct. 19, 1988, at A3 (after Philip Mors Cos. offered $90 per share
for Kraft Inc. after close of trading on previous day, Kraft shares rose from $60.125 to
$88.25, or 47.2%, in one day); Pillsbwy May Have Few Options As It Considers Grand
Met Offer, WALL ST, I., Oct. 5, 1988, at A4 (after Grand Metropolitan PLC offered $60
per share for Pillsbury Co. after close of trading on previous day, Pillsbury shares rose
from $39 to $57, or 46.1%, in one day); Amerincan Home Offers $8.5 Billion for Cyanamud,
WALL Sr. J., Aug. 3, 1994, at A3 (following American Home Products Corporation's
surprise announcement of a $95-per-share bid for American Cyanamid Co. after trading in
American Cyanamid was halted on the New York Stock Exchange, American Cyanamid's
share prices rose from $63.75 to $93 in after-hours trading, an increase of 45.9%); Dow
Jones Seeks To Buy Rest of Telerate for $18 a Share, or Total of $576 Million, WALL ST. I.,
Sept. 22, 1989, at AS (after Dow Jones & Co. proposed to buy share of Telerate Inc. for
$18 per share, Telerate's shares on the New York Stock Exchange closed at $20.375).
As the examples just cited suggest, the large majority of the stock price increase takes
place within a five-day period. This is further demonstrated by a study by the Office of the
Cluef Economist of the S.E.C. of 172 exchange-listed tender offers from 1981 to 1985. See
OFFCE OF THE CHinF ECONOMmS, S.E.C., STOcK TRADiNG BEFoRE THE ANNOUNCEE OF
TENDER OFFERS: INSIDER TRADiNG OR MARKET ANTICPATIoN? (1987). This report
examined the excess price returns of the target compames' stocks in the twenty days before
and five days after the news of the offer broke, and found that 80.6% of the excess returns
took place in the five trading days prior to the day news broke. Id. Table 1. For the 103
tender offers that were "secret" (i.e., for which no rumors of a takeover had been publicly
reported), the percentage of the increase in those five days was even greater: 89.0%. Id.
Table 3. And for twenty secret offers in which the bidders had acquired relatively small
percentages of the target stock (so that acquisition of large blocks could not have been used
as a signal), the entire price rise took place in five days. Id. Table 5. Hence, for a
significant fraction of offers, the relevant price increase takes place in a period shorter than
that in which a margin call must be met. In any event, at least one case has alleged that a
pre-offer price run-up would simply require a higher offer so as to maintain the expected
50% premium. See Litton Indus., Inc., 967 F.2d at 746.
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short sales made by limited-liability corporations established with financing just
sufficient to meet the initial margin requirement of the short sale? Such
corporations could provide the returns of the short sale to its investors if the
stock price went down, but could use their limited liability to shield their
investors from losses exceeding the margin if the price went up. The reason
this does not occur, I suggest, is that the transaction costs of such an
arrangement would exceed the probable losses on the short sales. Even though
a stock's price does occasionally increase in value by more than 50%,329 such
events are not common, and one would have to make these sorts of evasion
arrangements for each stock that one sold short. If one could predict for which
stocks evasion would be necessary-that is, which stocks were likely to greatly
increase in price-those stocks would not be sold short at all.
The same point applies to purchases of unlimited-liability stocks. Although
rapid stock price rises of more than 50% are not common, neither are
corporate insolvencies as a result of tort liability 330 Therefore, it seems
unlikely that Professor Grundfest's evasion strategies would be perceived by
shareholders as worth their transaction costs. This is especially so because
investors purchase stock only if they expect its price to go up, not if they
expect it to drop, let alone to drop below zero. 331 Therefore, investors are
unlikely to believe that the chance that a stock in which they invest will subject
them to an unlimited-liability judgment is sufficiently large to justify incurring
even quite low transaction costs to avoid it.332 This is borne out by the
329 It is true that if the price of the stock sold short increased, the short-selling
corporation's broker would issue a margin call, see supra note 323 and accompanying text,
and that if the corporation did not meet it, .the broker could buy the shares before an actual
loss occurred. But if the stock experienced a dramatic and rapid price increase-analogous,
in the unlimited liability case, to a catastrophic tort-the broker could be subject to the
losses beyond the initial margin requirement.
3 30 Il fact, in the examples that come most readily to mind, Johns-Manville's liabilities
for asbestos injuries and A.H. Robins's as a result of the Dalkon Shield, the compames
concerned filed for bankruptcy as much for tactical reasons as because of insolvency. See
generally Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and Abuse of the Bankruptcy
Law-Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 IOWA L. REV. 199, 202-10 (1985) (discussion
Johns-Mansville bankruptcy); RicHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAw: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991). In other cases of extremely large tort liability, such
as Umon Carbide's at Bhopal and the Exxon Valdez, no insolvency resulted.
331 This is so just as short-sellers would not sell a stock short if they believed that its
price would rise.
332 See Leebron, supra note 1, at 1573 ("Within the range of probabilities and
magnitudes of loss that are likely to characterize an unlimited liability regine, the more
pronounced effect of unlimited liability will probably be on the riskiness of the investment
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example, discussed previously, 333 of American Express when it was an
unlimited-liability company. American Express was at one time sued for an
amount considerably more than its net assets, 334 and the price of the stock
dropped by 43%,335 but it continued to trade, even among sophisticated and
well-capitalized investors.336 There was apparently no evidence that investors
took steps to avoid possible liability. 337
Hence, both the short-sale analogy and the example of American Express
suggest that the imposition of unlimited liability would not necessarily prompt
investors to seek mechanisms by which they could avoid the risk of unlimited
liability. These examples, of course, are not perfect analogies to the unlimited
liability proposal of Professors Hansmann and Kraakman. Short sales are in
some significant ways different from stock purchases, 338 and the American
Express events took place in 1963, 3 39 when the financial markets were very
different. Nevertheless, these examples are of unlimited liability in the real
world, and as such are perhaps more telling than theory The story they tell is
one of investors who, instead of incurring additional costs to avoid a risk of
unlimited liabiity that they perceive as slight, simply accept that risk as they do
many others.
rather than on the expected value."). A shareholder can, of course, diversify to reduce the
significance of unlimited-liability risk.
333 See supra text accompanying notes 50-55.
334 See Grossman, supra note 29, at 81-82 & n.61.
335 Id. at 82 n.63.
336 Id. at 81-82.
337 Grossman describes none, and the continued investment in American Express by at
least one mutual fund suggests that there was none. See id. at 82. Grossman notes that the
American Express entity that was potentially liable was actually an incorporated subsidiary
of the publicly-owned corporation. Id. at 81-82 n. 61. Grossman indicates that American
Express treated the obligation as one of the parent corporation, id., but it is unclear whether
the parent corporation undertook the obligation in a way sufficiently formal to make its
investors liable. This issue, though, is of little importance for present purposes, where the
point is that even with the potential of a large judgment against American Express, enough
investors viewed its prospects optimistically to keep its price at more than one-half of its
pre-suit price. It is unlikely that those investors, while believing American Express to be a
good investment at that price, would have been willing to incur transaction costs to avoid
potential unlimited liability.
338 See supra notes 322-23.
339 Grossman, supra note 29, at 81.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Unlimited shareholder liability would radically change the way we look at
corporations. In an unlimited-liability world, one part at least of the veil
between corporation and shareholder would no longer exist. As a result, the
relationship between corporation and shareholder would be, both in law and in
fact, much closer than it is currently. The two parts of this change-the legal
and the factual-would reinforce each other. The legal change would. be
reflected in court decisions enforcing unlimited liability Regardless of the exact
contours that decisions in this area took initially, there would be at least some
shareholders-mutual funds, for example--whom it would be both
jurisdictionally and practically feasible for tort creditors to pursue.34° If only a
few unlimited-liability judgments against these shareholders were obtained and
enforced, almost all shareholders would examine their corporate investments
with a new attention. 341 They would investigate the business activities of the
corporations in which they owned shares, and if they believed those activities
presented a risk of unlimited liability, they-would bear that risk only for a
price.342 These changes in shareholder behavior would make more apparent-
and more real-the role of shareholders in influencing corporate behavior, and
it would in turn be acknowledged by the courts in an increased willingness to
enforce unlimited liability.
The preceding description of a world of unlimited shareholder liability
perhaps presents the acceptance of liability as a bit more inevitable than it
actually would be. However, I believe that this description is more plausible
than those of Professors Alexander and Grundfest, who discuss unlimited
liability as if it would have no effect at all on shareholders' investment
decisions or on courts' treatments of the corporate-shareholder relationship.
Professor Alexander claims that shareholders under unlimited liability would
lack "even knowledge of" the activities of the corporations in which they
invest.343 Professor Grundfest claims that "stock market prices would not fall
to reflect the risks associated with [unlimited] liability." 344 Both of these
assertions reflect an assumption that shareholders would not react at all to the
imposition of unlimited liability. Although that assumption conflicts with what
340 See supra parts III & V.
341 See supra part IV.
342 See supra part VI.
343 Alexander, supra note 9, at 409. See also supra text accompanying note 15.
344Grundfest, supra note 9, at 393 (footnote omitted). See also supra text
accompanying notes 20-23.
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little evidence we have of shareholder reactions to unlimited liability345 and
with normal expectations regarding shareholder behavior,346 it is only by
relying on it that Professors Alexander and Grundfest can maintain their rather
claims that a state's imposition of unlimited liability would be entirely
ineffective. 347 If one accepts the more realistic view that shareholders-and
courts-would respond to a fundamental change in the legal definition of a
corporation, one concludes that unlimited liability could further the goals of
both tort law and corporate law.
345 See Grossman, supra note 29, at 81-82 & n.63 (noting that when American
Express, an unlimited-liability company at the time, was sued for an amount greater than its
net assets, its share prices dropped by 43%). See also supra text accompanying notes 333-
337.
346 See supra parts IV.A & VI.A.
3 47 See Alexander, supra note 9, at 444 ("Taking a procedural view of the proposal to
implement unlimited shareholder liability through state tort law lead to the conclusion that
this approach simply cannot work."); Grundfest, supra note 9, at 425 ("Capital markets..
synthesize limited liability pricing m a[n] [unlimited] liability world.").
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